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Abstract 
ESSAYS ON DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 
by 
Yakun Wang 
Advisor: Professor Donal Byard 
Essay 1: Using data from StockTwits.com, the most popular investment-dedicated social media 
network in the US, I develop new and direct measures of investors' aggregate attention to the stock 
market, and to individual stocks. I then examine the behavior of investors' aggregate attention and 
firm-specific attention. First, I show that investors' aggregate attention to the stock market is higher 
during earnings season than non-earnings season, but is not lower on Fridays compared to other 
weekdays. Second, I show that investors' firm-specific attention is positively related to Earnings 
Response Coefficients (ERCs) and negatively related to Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
(PEAD), indicating that investor attention, as directly measured using social media data, enhances 
the processing of information and price discovery around earnings announcements. Finally, I find 
that when multiple firms announce their earnings on the same day, each earning announcement is 
not equally distracting: larger firms and firms with better information environment distract more 
attention from smaller firms. 
Essay 2: Using data from StockTwits.com, the most popular social media networks dedicated to 
the discussion of stock investment, I textually analyze the content of 11 million tweets written by 
both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. From this analysis, I develop measures of the 
information content of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors’ tweets and a daily measure of 
the degree of information asymmetry between these two classes of investors. Using sporadic 
management forecasts as a research setting, I examine the impact of public disclosures on the 
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information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. I find that: 1) 
information asymmetry between these two classes of investors increases in the short term (about 
a week) after public disclosures-specifically, sporadic management forecasts; 2) information 
asymmetry decreases in the longer term (roughly a week) after public disclosures; and 3) more 
precise public disclosures result in a smaller short-term increase (and a larger long-term decrease) 
in information asymmetry. 
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Essay 1 
Measuring Investor Attention using Social Media Activity 
1. Introduction 
Attention is a scarce but necessary cognitive resource for information processing 
(Kahneman 1973). When making investment decisions, investors face an abundance of 
information but have only a limited amount of attention with which to process this 
information. As a result, investors must allocate their limited attention among multiple 
events, and this allocation can have a significant impact on investors’ information 
processing, and the subsequent price discovery process. In recent years, the rapid 
development of the internet and social media has exponentially increased the amount of 
information that is competing for investors’ attention. In an era of information abundance, 
understanding how investors allocate their limited attention is an important research 
question for both practitioners and academic researchers. This study uses social media data 
to develop new and direct measures of investor attention that can be applied at both the 
individual firm level and at the aggregated market level.  
A number of studies investigate the role of investor attention in affecting market 
reactions to information disclosures. Because researchers have not been able to directly 
observe investor attention, these studies necessarily employ indirect measures of investor 
attention. For example, Francis et al. (1992) assume that investor attention is lower in non-
trading hours than in trading hours. Given this assumption, they show that, on average, the 
market responds more slowly to disclosures made during non-trading hours. They attribute 
this slower response to lower investor attention. Hou et al. (2008) assume that investor 
attention is lower in down-market periods than in up-market periods, and they show that 
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stock prices react more slowly to earnings surprises in down-market periods vs. up-market 
periods. They attribute this effect to the influence of investor attention. Hirshleifer et al. 
(2009) implicitly assume that investors have a fixed endowment of attention per day, so 
that earnings announcements made on the same day distract attention from each other; 
given this assumption, they argue that the number of earnings announcements on the same 
day should be negatively associated with the amount of attention each announcing firm 
receives. DellaVigna and Pollett (2009) assume that market attention is lower on Fridays 
than on other weekdays; they show that earnings announcements made on Fridays have 
slower price responses, which they attribute to less investor attention. 
Using such indirect proxies for investor attention necessarily requires researchers 
to invoke maintained assumptions about how investor attention is fixed in time, or changes 
over time, and how investors allocate their attentions among competing earnings 
announcements. One limitation of using such indirect proxies is that the resulting empirical 
tests are, by definition joint tests of the maintained assumptions (typically, that investor 
attention vary across time) and the test hypothesis (typically, that investor attention affects 
some market outcome such as stock returns). Another potential limitation of using indirect 
measures of investor attention is the difficulty in generalizing these measures. For example, 
consider the maintained assumptions invoked by two studies: Hirshleifer et al. (2009) 
assume that investors have a fixed endowment of attention per unit of time, so they predict 
that earnings announcements made on the same day distract each other. As a result, on 
average, earnings announcements made on a “busy” day receive less attention than those 
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made on an “easy” day.1 On the other hand, DellaVigna and Pollett (2009) assume that, 
compared to other weekdays, investors have a smaller allocation of attention on Fridays 
than on other weekdays. Among weekdays Friday has the lowest number of earnings 
announcements (7.6% of all earnings announcements); Applying the assumption of 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009)- that the number of earnings announcements made on the same 
day decreases the attention each announcement receives- earnings announcements made 
on Fridays should receive more (not-less) attention than earnings announcements made on 
other weekdays. These inconsistent predictions of investor attention between Fridays and 
other weekdays points to the limitation of using indirect proxies for investor attention.  
In recent years, social media networks have emerged as a significant user-driven 
venue where individual participants, including a large community of investors, can 
participate in discussion and communication over the internet.2 Investor-related social 
media data can potentially allow one to observe individual investor attention to particular 
stocks or to the entire stock market at an un-aggregated level.3 In this paper, I propose a 
direct measure of investor attention based upon social media participants’ twitting activities 
on Stocktwits.com, the most popular investment-related social media micro-blogging 
website in the US.4 Stocktwits.com features a platform on which users are able to post a 
short discussion of no more than 140 characters, called a tweet. These tweets are then 
posted to the main board of the website, as well as specific sub-pages sorted by stock tickers. 
                                                          
1 A “Busy” day refers to a day with relatively more earnings announcements while an “Easy” day refers to a 
day with relatively fewer earnings announcements. 
2 Social media activities have been used by studies in social science such as sociology and psychology as a 
proxy for participants’ attention, see section 2.2 for a review of literature. 
3 Tweeting activity is identifiable to each individual user. 
4 By July of 2014, Stocktwits has more than 600,000 active users, and an average monthly volume of more 
than 3 million tweets. And according to Stocktwits, “the posts are viewed by an audience of over 40 million 
across the financial web and social media platforms.” 
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StockTwits.com provides an ideal setting to measure investor attention for a number of 
reasons: First, StockTwits.com is a venue specifically dedicated to debating the investment 
potential of stocks. Second, it has a relatively diversified user community that includes 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. According to users’ biography, the StockTwits 
user community consists of a mix of retail and institutional investors, financial analysts, 
etc. Third, StockTwits.com features a “Cashtagging” design to clearly identify the ticker 
each tweet is referring to. 5  This feature enables the development of programs to clearly 
extract the company each post refers to, minimizing the misclassification problem common 
to other internet-based data sources.6   
Using the Application Programming Interface (API) service of StockTwits.com, I 
analyze 11 million tweets posted between 2009 and 2013 by roughly 290,000 identical 
users. Based on the tweets data, I construct: 1) firm-day measures of investor attention to 
individual stocks and 2) daily measures of aggregated investor attention to the whole stock 
market. With these two new measures, I undertake a number of empirical analysis that seek 
to identify time-series and cross-sectional variation in investor attention and the market 
effects that follow from this variation in investor attention. First, I study how aggregated 
investor attention to the whole stock market changes over time. Due to the difficulties in 
acquiring aggregated investor attention data, prior studies necessarily made assumptions 
about time-series variation in investor attention to the stock market. Using direct measure 
                                                          
5 Each tweet on StockTwits.com is tagged with the ticker symbol (expressed as $GOOG or $AAPL) that the 
author is referring to, in practice called “Cashtagging”. This special design provide a mechanism to clearly 
extract the company reference in each post with no misclassification. By searching for the “$”, program can 
automatically extract the ticker each tweet is related to. 
6 For example, using Google Search Volume Index is related to misclassification problem. As discussed in 
Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2012) and Da et al. (2011), investors could refer to a firm by using the name 
of the firm, the initial letter of the firm, or the ticker symbol of the firm. The non-standard format add problem 
when identifying the reference of the post, for example “Apple” could refer to a fruit or Apple Inc. 
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of investor attention, I provide new and direct evidence as to the variation in investor 
attention overtime.  Specifically, I test for variation in investor attention over two 
timeframes: 1) between earnings season (January, April, July and October) and non-
earnings season (all other months), and 2) between different weekdays. I find that during 
earnings season investors’ overall attention is about twice the level of attention during non-
earnings season, and I find no evidence that investor attention is lower on Fridays than on 
other weekdays.7 
Direct measures of investor attention also enable one to observe the cross-section 
allocation of investor attention to different firms that announce their earnings on the same 
date, allowing for a direct test of whether earnings announcements made on the same day 
attract equal amounts of attention. I find that, on average, earnings announcements by 
larger firms, and firms with higher media coverage and higher analyst following attract 
more attention than the earnings announcements of other firms. This finding extends the 
existing results on attention distraction theory (e.g. Hirshleifer et al. 2003, 2009 and 2012) 
by showing that earnings announcements made on the same day can have different levels 
of attention attraction, resulting in more/less distraction for other stocks firms. 
Finally, I link investor attention, measured using social media data, to market 
reactions to information disclosures. I directly test whether investor attention is associated 
with the pricing of earnings information by examining returns around and following, 
                                                          
7 My finding that attention is not lower on Fridays is consistent with a recent paper by DeHann, Shevlin and 
Thornock (2014), which uses four proxies of investor attention (News, Analysts, Trading volume, Google 
SVI) to test for similar variations. For more discussion of ERC, see Kothari (2001) on how multiple firm 
fundamentals including expectations about growth, discount rates, earnings persistence etc. affect ERC. For 
example, macroeconomic factors specific to Fridays include First-Time Jobless claim report, and 
employment situation reports, etc. 
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earnings announcements. My findings are twofold. First, I provide direct evidence that on 
average, investor attention on earnings announcements date is positively related to 
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) and negatively related to Post Earnings 
Announcements Drift (PEAD), suggesting that investor attention enables investors to 
better process new information and thus enhances the pricing of earnings announcements. 
Second, I provide evidence that post earnings announcements drift (PEAD) is concentrated 
in low attention firms (lowest quintile), but does not appear in higher attention firms (upper 
quintile), suggesting that the distraction effect documented by Hirshleifer et al. (2009) is 
not universal for all firms. Specifically, my result suggests that only firms that attract less 
attention suffer from being distracted by other same-day earnings announcement firms. 
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on investor attention 
and market reactions to earnings. First, it introduces a new and direct measure of investor 
attention that is widely accessible to researchers and practitioners. Prior studies that use 
indirect measures have to invoke some maintained assumptions about the pattern of 
investor attention. In contrast, the direct measures of investor attention that I introduce in 
this study can be used in a wider range of potential studies using different settings; further, 
these direct measures do not require the restrictions imposed by invoking some maintained 
assumption about the pattern of investor attention. 
Second, although it can be inferred that investors pay less attention when they are 
distracted by other life events during some periods, this paper provides direct empirical 
evidence that investor attention to the market varies across time. Specifically, my evidence 
that investor attention is higher during earnings season than non-earnings season is new to 
the literature. Similar to DeHann et al. (2014), using direct measure of investor attention, 
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my evidence that investor attention on Fridays is no different than other weekday is also 
new to the behavioral finance and behavioral asset pricing literatures.  
 Third, this paper contributes to the recent literature on the effect of social media on 
stock markets. With the fast pace of technological advancement, the Internet is playing an 
increasingly important role in capital markets. Existing literature focuses on Google Search 
Volume Index (SVI) and study investors’ information searching (demanding) activity (Da 
et al. 2010, Drake et al. 2012). A recent study by Curtis et al. (2014) used investors’ activity 
index from Market IQ to study investor attention and sentiment and the consequent market 
impact. My paper studies investor attention in a social network setting from an information 
generating (providing) perspective. My findings support the general idea that social media 
has a significant impact on the price discovery process in the capital market. Moreover, 
compared with Google SVI, StockTwits provides a more professional user base, a better 
identification of stock reference and, critically, cross-sectional comparability across 
different firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary 
of relevant literature, the institutional background and hypothesis development. Section III 
discusses the construction of attention measures using StockTwits data and the construction 
of other financial data. Section IV studies the time-series variation of market attention and 
investors’ allocation of attention among different firms that announce earnings on the same 
day.  Section V studies the impact of attention measured by social media on the price 
discovery process around earnings announcements. Section VI provides additional analysis. 
Section VII concludes the paper. 
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2. Background and Hypothesis 
2.1 Investor Attention and the Stock Market 
Investors face an abundance of information but only have a limited amount of 
attention to process the available information. The allocation of investor attention can have 
significant impact on the market reaction to new information. A number of theoretical 
studies examine the relationship between investor attention and the price discovery process 
around the disclosure of firms’ financial information. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2003) 
suggest that investors’ neglect of information signals can lead to mispricing related to 
publicly available accounting information. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) suggest that 
investor attention increases the speed of price discovery related to new accounting 
information. Peng (2005), and Peng and Xiong (2006) model the learning process of a 
representative investor who has limited attention; they show that because of their limited 
attention, investors exhibit “category-learning” behavior: investors first allocate more 
attention to market-level and industry-level information than firm specific information. As 
a result, macroeconomic shocks would increase the contemporaneous asset co-movement 
as investors allocate more attention to market-level information.  
Empirical studies have also explored the impact of investor attention on price 
discovery. Because investor attention is not directly observable, researchers necessarily 
employ indirect measures of investor attention. For example, Francis et al. (1992) assume 
that investor attention is lower in non-trading hours than trading hours, and they show that 
on average the market responds more slowly to disclosures made during non-trading hours. 
They attribute this slower response to lower investor attention. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) 
implicitly assume that investors have a fixed endowment of attention per day, so that 
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earnings announcements made on the same day distract attention from each other; given 
this assumption, they argue that the number of earnings announcements on the same day 
should be negatively associated with the amount of attention each firm receives. 
DellaVigna and Pollett (2009) assume that market attention is lower on Fridays than on 
other weekdays; they show that earnings announcements made on Fridays have slower 
prices responses, which they attribute to lower levels of investor attention. 
Using indirect proxies for investor attention necessarily requires the researcher to 
invoke one or more maintained assumption about how investor attention is fixed in time, 
or changes over time, or how investors allocate their attention cross-sectionally. The 
resulting empirical tests are thus joint tests of the maintained hypothesis and the test 
hypothesis (typically that investor attention affects some market outcomes such as returns). 
This study proposes a direct measure of investors’ attention based upon investors’ twitting 
activity on the internet, which can be used to study investors’ attention without making 
maintained assumptions. 
2.2 Directly Measure Investor Attention using Social Media (StockTwits) Data 
Online social media has experienced exponential development in the past decade. 
According to the Online Social Media Whitepaper published by BI Intelligence, there are 
at least 15 major social media platforms in the world, each has more than 100 million active 
users.8 The largest three social media networks (Twitter, Facebook and Weibo) had a total 
of 1.6 billion registered users by the end of year 2012. An enormous amount of information 
                                                          
8 http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worlds-largest-social-networks-2013-12 
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is being communicated through social media platforms. Twitter, the most influential social 
media in the world9, broadcasted an average of 400 million “Tweets” per day in 2013.  
Social media networks are also playing an increasingly important role in the 
financial markets. In April 2013, the SEC approved firms’ use of Twitter to communicate 
company financial information to investors.10 As of the end of 2013, more than 90% of 
S&P 500 firms had official investor relations Twitter accounts to communicate directly 
with investors. Chen, Hwang, and Liu (2013) show that Twitter activity by company 
executives can help predict abnormal returns. In addition, Twitter’s significant impact on 
the stock market is also evident from the following event:  On April 24, 2013, the Dow 
Jones industrial average plunged by more than 140 points immediately after a hacker sent 
out a false tweet from Associated Press’s account about a false terrorist attack. 
Social media data provides social scientists an opportunity to directly measure 
participants’ attention at a large scale. Cognitive science studies (e.g. James and Jennings, 
1996) highlight that, in order to process and communicate information, people must first 
allocate attention to that information. Therefore, when one posts information related to a 
topic on a social media website, one must have first allocated attention to that specific topic. 
A number of recent studies in social science as diverse as sociology and psychology have 
used twitting volume to study attention. For example, Kwon et al. (2013) use Twitter 
volume as a proxy for consumer’s attention to a brand, and find positive relationships 
between advertising, consumer attention and long-term brand loyalty. Ginsberg et al. (2009) 
                                                          
9 According to Alexas.com, Twitter.com has the highest visit volume of all major social media websites.  
10 http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.VG49dvldV8E 
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find that Twitter volume related to “flu” is associated to subsequent spread of pandemic 
flu in a region; they attribute this relationship to the increased attention level to the disease. 
In this study, I proposed a novel and direct measure of investor attention based upon 
investors’ twitting activities on StockTwits.com, the most popular investment dedicated 
social media micro-blogging website in the US. By July of 2014, Stocktwits had more than 
600,000 active users, and an average monthly volume of more than 3 million tweets. These 
posts are viewed by an audience of over 40 million across the financial web and social 
media platforms on a daily basis. On StockTwits.com, user can post a tweet of less than 
140 characters related to one to three specific stock tickers, these related tickers are labeled 
with “$”, for example “$AAPL” would indicate that the content of this tweet is directly 
related to Apple Inc. These tweets are than displayed on the StockTwits.com website for 
other users to browse, re-tweet or comment upon.  
2.3 Does Investor Attention to the Market Change Over Time? 
The standard theoretical models in accounting and finance assume that individuals 
make investment decisions using all available information. However, since investor 
attention is limited, attention restricts investors’ ability to incorporate all available 
information into prices. Whether investor attention changes over time has been subject to 
much debate, but the literature still lacks direct evidence about the variation in investor 
attention to the overall market. To infer market attention or inattention, prior studies 
necessarily use indirect measures of market attention, and they rely on maintained 
assumptions about how investors allocate their attention between the stock market and 
other life events (e.g. Lim et al. 2010).  
12 
 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Damodaran (1989) assume earnings 
announcements made on Fridays receive less attention as they assume investors are 
distracted by other life activities just before the weekend. Since relatively fewer firms 
release earnings on Fridays (based on my sample, 7.6% of all earnings announcement occur 
on a Friday, relative to 23% on Wednesday), investors may actually have more attention 
to allocate to each earnings announcement made on a Friday than on other weekdays. 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) attribute the lower ERCs on Friday to lower investor 
attention; however, Melessa (2012) finds evidence that lower Friday ERCs are related to 
greater macroeconomic uncertainties on Fridays. Additionally, DeHann et al. (2014) 
suggest that lower attention on Friday is inconsistent with the working arrangement of 
professional financial expertise such as financial analysts, institutional investors and 
professional asset managers. To the best of my knowledge, prior empirical studies has not 
explicitly addressed the difference in investor attention between Friday and other weekdays 
with direct measures of investor attention to the overall stock market, thus my first 
hypotheses, stated in the null form, is that: 
H1a: Aggregated Investor attention to the entire stock market is not different between 
Friday and other weekdays. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) assume earnings announcements made on the same day 
distract attention from each other. As a result, earnings announcements made during 
earnings season (when there are more earnings announcements on a given day) should 
receive less attention than those made during non-earnings season. The premise for this 
assertion is presumably that attention to the stock market is the same during earnings 
season as during non-earnings season. However, according to studies in cognitive science 
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(for example, Kahneman 1973, Simons and Levin 1997), attention allocation is related to 
the amount of stimulus in the environment. If this is the case, during earnings season, 
investors could transfer their attention from other life activities to the stock market. As a 
result, earnings announcements made during earnings season (this is also a period when 
number of same-day earnings announcements is high) could receive equal or even more 
attention than those made during non-earnings season. Since prior studies have not 
examined if market attention is different between earnings season and non-earnings season, 
I state my second hypothesis in the null form: 
H1b: Aggregated investor attention to the entire stock market is no different between 
earnings season and non-earnings season. 
2.4 Investors’ Allocation of Attention among Competing Earnings Announcements 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) argue that earnings announcements made on the same day 
distract each other; therefore the number of earnings announcements on the same day 
should be negatively related to the level of attention each announcement receives. They 
document that the market underreaction and subsequent post-earnings announcements drift 
(PEAD) increases in the level of distraction from other announcements. In other words, the 
higher the number of same-day announcements, the higher the degree of underreaction and 
PEAD a firm will experience.  
Using the number of same-day earnings announcements as an indirect proxy for 
investor attention has inherent limitations. By focusing on the number of same-day 
announcements, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) implicitly assume that all firms are equally 
distracting to each other. However, investors perceive and process some information more 
easily than other information, and the benefit of processing some information is also higher 
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than others. Consequently, I propose that when faced with competing earnings 
announcements, investors process these earnings announcements in a ranking order based 
on attributes related to information processing costs and potential processing benefit of 
such announcements. As a result, firms that have higher processing benefit (lower 
processing cost) will be processed at a higher priority and suffer less or no stock price 
underreaction and PEAD; firms that have lower processing benefit (higher processing cost) 
will be processed at a lower priority and experience higher levels of stock price 
underreaction and PEAD. Having a direct measure of investor attention allow me to 
directly test for the variation in investors’ processing order of firms’ earnings 
announcements. 
I consider two attributes on which investors may rank firms in order to decide the 
priority of their information processing. The first attribute is the potential benefit of 
processing specific firms’ earnings announcements. Peng (2005) and Peng and Xiong 
(2006) show that investors exhibit “category-learning” behavior: investors allocate more 
attention to macro-level information than to firm-specific information. Since earnings 
announcements of larger firms are likely to contain more macro-level, or industry level 
information than those of smaller firms (Watts and Zimmerman 1990), I expect investors 
to rank big firms’ earnings announcements higher in order of processing than small firms’ 
earnings announcements. The second attribute I propose is the cost of processing specific 
firms’ earnings announcements. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) suggest that attention is 
more likely to be directed toward information that is easy to access and process. Firms with 
a better information environment provide more easily accessible information to investors. 
Their information are also more reliable compared to firms with poor information 
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environment, requiring less effort to verify. Thus, the cost of accessing and processing 
information for firms with better information environments would be lower.   
In summary of the two possible attributes, I expect the following: 
H2a: Ceteris Paribus, firms larger in size attract more attention. 
H2b: Ceteris Paribus, firms with a better information environment attract more attention. 
2.5 Investor Attention and Price Discovering Process of Earnings 
A large body of literature suggests that information in earnings announcements is 
not instantly incorporated into stock prices; on average, investors underreact to earnings 
announcements and this underreaction results in a price drift following earnings 
announcements, known as Post Earnings Announcements Drift - PEAD (Ball and Brown, 
1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990, etc.). Traditional asset pricing models assume that: 
1) all investors receive public information instantaneously, and 2) to maximize their 
personal utility, investors undertake trading actions immediately upon receipt of this 
information. When investors are paying attention to an earnings announcement, these 
investors will react to the information in earnings announcements in a more timely fashion, 
resulting in a higher immediate price reaction to earnings (ERC), and a lower delayed price 
reaction to earnings (PEAD). 
As discussed in section 2.1, prior empirical studies rely on indirect measure of 
investor attention to study the relationship between attention and price reactions to earnings 
announcements. Indirect measures of investor attention are generally based on one or more 
maintained assumption (for example, market attention is lower on Friday), making 
empirical tests using indirect measures joint tests of their maintained hypothesis and testing 
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hypothesis. This inherent limitation of indirect measures of investor attention potentially 
create uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of results. For example, DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009) find lower earnings response coefficients (ERC) for Friday earnings 
announcements and attribute the lower ERC to lower market attention on Fridays. On the 
other hand, Melessa (2012) finds evidence that lower Friday ERCs are not purely driven 
by lower attention, but rather by macroeconomic uncertainties on Friday. To the best of 
my knowledge, no prior study examines the impact of investor attention on price reactions 
to earnings using a direct measure of investor attention. 
Additionally, despite the exponential development of social media, most prior 
studies focus on the relationship between the tone of social media and future stock price 
changes (e.g. Chen et al. 2014). Whether investor attention captured using social media 
data is related to the speed of price reactions to earnings announcements is an open 
empirical question.  
H3: The level of investor attention measured using social media data is positively 
associated with the level of Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) and negatively 
associated with level of Post Earnings Announcements Drift (PEAD).  
3. Data and Sample 
3.1 Construction of Attention Measure with StockTwits Data 
Collecting and processing of the tweet volume data from StockTwits 
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I obtain tweets from all members of StockTwits.com from July 2009 to December 
2013.11 For each tweet, I acquire the tweet content, post time, and user information through 
the Application Programming Interface (API) service provided by StockTwits.com. My 
raw twitter sample consists of approximately 11 million tweets posted by about 290,000 
identical active users.  
 For each tweet in the sample, I extract the associated ticker symbol by analyzing 
and locating the “$” used in the content. A small fraction of the tweets refer to more than 
one ticker symbol; when a tweet mentions more than one ticker symbols, I count all 
references as a unique post.12 This initial sample contains 14,356 ticker symbols. Since 
some of the symbols represents non-stock assets such as gold, FOREX, or futures, I further 
identify ticker symbols related to stocks by matching to stock tickers in the CRSP database. 
Finally, I match each stock ticker symbol to firms’ PERMNOs, a unique firm identifier 
provided by CRSP. This procedure yields a final sample of 7,843,122 tweets made by 
approximately 200,000 individual users that covers 6,786 unique PERMNOs.  
De-trending StockTwits Volume 
When using StockTwits volume as a measure of investor attention to the stock 
market, or to a specific firm, one must be cautious about the increasing popularity of the 
StockTwits website over the sample period of 2009 to 2013. Over my sample periods, the 
number of active users13 of StockTwits.com has an average month-to-month increase of 
about 3.5%, roughly 42% increase year-to-year. In order to isolate the impact of the 
                                                          
11 The data from July to December in 2009 was used only in the de-trend process because this website was 
not so popular during that period and the number of post were significantly lower. 
12 The number of post containing multiple ticker symbol is very small. In my raw sample, 94% cover only 
one ticker symbol, 5% cover two ticker symbols, 1% cover more than two ticker symbols 
13  Active users are defined as users who have posted at least one twitter in the past three months. 
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increasing numbers of users on my attention measures, I de-trend the raw measures of 
attention using two methods.  For daily and monthly market-level attention used in Section 
3, I deflate the total number of posts to the first day/month of the testing period using the 
change in numbers of users. For daily attention related to a specific stock, I adopt a rolling 
average method: attention is calculated as the difference in tweeting volume between the 
event day and the rolling average of the same weekday in eight weeks before and eight 
weeks after the event day. As a result, the attention measure for individual stock I used in 
the study is essentially a measure of abnormal attention for a given stock on a given day. 
Appendix A provided summary statistics of my attention measures and firms’ 
characteristics. 
3.2 Construction of Financial Data 
My initial event window consists of 77,015 quarterly earnings announcements for 
6,011 firms. I merge data for earnings announcements with attention data from Stocktwits 
and require non-missing values in both datasets. I identify earnings announcements dates 
by comparing the dates reported by both Compustat and I/B/E/S. When the dates are 
available in both databases and are difference from each other, following DellaVigna and 
Pollett (2009), I take the earlier date of the two. For earnings announcements made after 4 
o’clock, following Hirshleifer et al. (2009), I add 1 trading day to the announcement date 
when calculating the daily market return. 
To estimate the forecast error (FE) as a measure of the earnings surprise, I calculate 
the difference between announced EPS reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings 
forecast, defined as the median of the most recent forecasts from individual analysts made 
in the last 45 days acquired from the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail tape, normalized by the 
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stock price at the end of the quarter (Kothari, 2001). Following DellaVigna and Pollett 
(2009), I exclude observations: 1) Where actual EPS is larger in absolute value than the 
price of a share (255 Obs), 2) penny stocks (149 Obs), and 3) firms with total market value 
smaller than $5 million (38 Obs). My final earnings announcements sample consists of 
60,519 earnings announcements. 
In order to study the post earnings announcements drift (PEAD), I estimate the 
market adjusted returns for earnings announcements windows (CAR) and for the two 
months following earnings announcement dates (PEAD). I measure market returns as the 
Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the testing period, I require sample 
observations to have at least 44 non-zero return trading days during the period +2 to +60 
trading days following announcements. CARk(i,j) is defined as the difference between the 
buy-and-hold return for stock k from day i to day j, and the benchmark return of firm k’s 
matched portfolio based on size and market-to-book ratio. Benchmark portfolio is formed following 
25 portfolios sorted on 5 size and 5 market-to-book ratio ranks, benchmark return is acquired from 
Kenneth French’s data library. 
4. Study of Investor Attention 
             Using the direct measure of investor attention derived from Stocktwits tweeting 
volume. I first study characteristics of investor attention, including 1) how investor 
attention to the whole stock market changes over time (H1); and 2) how investors allocate 
their attention among competing earnings announcements (H2).  
4.1 Does Investor Attention to the Stock Market Change Overtime? 
4.1.1 Univariate Analysis: 
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Univariant results are reported in Table 1C, Figure 1 and Figure 2. These univariate 
tests investigate how market attention varies across time, mainly focusing on: 1) the 
difference between Friday and Other Weekdays, as proposed by DellaVigna and Pollett 
(2009), and 2) the difference between Earnings Season and Non-Earnings Season. 
Following previous studies, earnings season is defined as the first month following the end 
of a fiscal quarter, when a large number of firms announce their earnings: January, April, 
July and October.  
As can be seen in Table1C, the mean number of tweets on Friday is 9,507 (Median 
5,342), compared with 9,750 on other weekdays (Median 5,823). A t-Test of the mean 
(Wilcox Test for Median) reveals that aggregated market attention on Friday is not 
significantly different from that on other weekdays (p-value for mean 0.722, p-value for 
median 0.657). This finding is also confirmed by graphical evidence: Figure 1 represents 
the distribution of Earnings announcements and the distribution of market attention on each 
weekday. As shown in Figure 1, even though only 7.6% of total earnings announcements 
were released on Friday, the market attention on Friday is still 18.45%, higher than the 
mean on Monday (15.77%) and not significantly different from the mean of other 
weekdays (19.45%). 
In Table 1C, the mean of daily tweets during earnings season is 11,056 (median 
6,445), compared with 7,566 (Median 5,151) for a day during non-earnings season. Both 
t-test (p-Value 0.00) and Wilcox test (p-Value 0.01) show that market attention during 
earnings season is significantly higher than during non-earnings season. This result is also 
illustrated in Figure 2, a histograms showing the deviation of each month’s attention 
relative to the six month rolling average. As shown in Figure 2, monthly attention during 
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earnings season is significantly higher than non-earnings season. On average aggregated 
market attention measured by the total number of stock-related tweets during an earnings 
season month is about 175% of the 5-month rolling average.  
4.1.2 Multivariate Analysis: 
Next, I conduct multivariate analysis to control for other known factors that might 
contribute to the variation of attention. The model used in this multivariate analysis is as 
follow: 
Market Attention𝑡 = α + 𝛽1Friday + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝑠 +
 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑏𝑠 𝑆𝑃500 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝑠 +
𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡                                                         (1) 
Market Attention is likely to be positively associated with the number of news 
articles on that day. I include number of news as a control a variable in the regression. I 
also control for other known factors that might affect market attention, including the 
Number of Earnings Announcements and Size of Announcers (Hirshleifer et al., 2009), 
Market Index Return and Market-wide Trading Volume (Hou, Xiong and Peng, 2008), and 
Number of firms that report Earnings Surprise (Lim et al. 2010). 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. In column (1) and column (3), the 
coefficients on the Friday dummy are not significant (t-stat=0.96), showing that, 
controlling for known factors that affect investor attention, attention on Fridays is not 
significantly different from other weekdays. In column (2) and column (3), the coefficients 
on the earnings season dummy are both positive and significant at p<0.01 level. The results 
show that controlling for known factors that affect investor attention to the stock market, 
attention during earnings season is significantly higher than in non-earnings season.  
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Taken together, the univariate and multivariate results confirm that market attention 
is not constant over time. The finding that investor attention on Friday is not significantly 
different from other weekdays suggests that the lower ERCs on Fridays found by previous 
researches might be driven by other omitted factors that are correlated with their 
maintained assumptions. The finding that investors pay more attention to the market during 
earnings season suggests that a maintained assumption used in prior studies that there is a 
fixed amount of market attention endowment per unit of time is also questionable. 
4.2 Investors’ Allocation of Attention among Competing Earnings Announcements 
4.2.1 Multivariate Study 
Next, I study investors’ allocation of attention to different firms that announce their 
earnings announcements on the same day. By using the number of same-day earnings 
announcements as a proxy for distraction, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) implicitly assume that 
firms have an equally distracting effect. Direct measures of investor attention allow me to 
relax this assumption and allow different levels of attention distraction. As discussed in 
section 2.4, I consider the possibility that investors allocate more attention to firm that are 
larger in size and firms that have better information environments.  
Following previous studies, I use two proxies for firms’ information environment 
in this test. First, I use firm’s media Coverage, Li, Shen and Ramash (2011) find that 
traditional newswires enhance the market pricing of earnings related information. 
Following this path, I used the total number of news articles related to a firm on Factiva as 
a proxy for firm’s media Coverage. Second, following prior studies, I use the number of 
analyst following a firm as a second proxy for firm’s information environment.  
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I also include a vector of control variables that might affect investors’ allocation of 
attention to a certain firm. Prior studies suggest that earnings surprise may serve as a stimuli 
and attracts attention to a firm. Also firms in high tech industry are more likely to attract 
attention (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). I include Book to Market and R&D intensity to control 
for this effect. Studies have shown that past winners in the market (e.g. Aboody et al. 2010) 
are more likely to attract attention when releasing subsequent earnings announcement, I 
include Past Quarter SUE as a control variable. 
The model I estimate is as follow: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Size +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽6𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐺𝐸 +
𝛽8𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (2) 
The results are reported in Table 4. In column (1), Size has a positive and significant 
coefficient at 0.272 (p<0.01), indicating that firms larger firms attracts more attention, one 
unit increase in size (in natural log) is associated with 27% increase in investor attention 
over its eight week rolling average. This result is consistent with investors exhibiting 
“category-learning” behavior as proposed by Peng (2005) and Peng and Xiong (2006): 
investors allocate more attention to macro-level information than firm-specific information. 
Consistent with larger firms’ earnings announcements conveying more information about 
the macroeconomics than those of smaller firms (e.g. Konchitchki and Patatoukas, 2013), 
investors allocate relatively more attention to bigger firms’ earnings announcements.  In 
column (2) and column (3), the two proxies for firms’ information environment are both 
positive and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that investors allocate more attention to firms 
with lower information acquisition and processing costs. Result are similar when including 
all three variables in column (4). 
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Taken together, the results suggest that when faced with multiple competing 
earnings announcements, investors strategically allocate their attention to these competing 
earnings announcements. Investors behave as if they weight the potential costs and benefits 
of processing information related to firms’ earnings announcements. Larger firms and 
firms that have better information environments attracts more attention. This finding also 
suggests that the number of earnings announcements on the same day (used in Hirshleifer 
et al., 2009) is not the only attribute that determines the level of attention to firms’ earnings 
announcements. Firm characteristics such as size and firms’ information environment also 
affect the distracting relationship among competing earnings announcements.  
5. Investor Attention and Price Discovery around Earnings Announcements 
           In this section, I further study the impact of investor attention measured by social 
media data on price discovery around earnings announcements. Following Bernard and 
Thomas (1989), and Kothari (2001), I examine the association between earnings surprises 
and 1) abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates (ERC) and, 2) abnormal 
stock returns in the windows after the earnings announcements date (PEAD).  
5.1 Univariate Analysis: 
In Table 5, forecast error and attention are each separated into five quintile groups. 
The median value of CAR [0, 1] is sorted by row while value of FE are sorted in column. 
FE is sorted into quintile by earnings forecast error scaled by last quarter end price, and 
attention is sorted into quintile by abnormal attention to a firm by quarter and year. Column 
(7) of Table 5 shows that the difference in CAR [0, 1] between the highest attention group 
(Q5) and lowest attention group (Q1) are significant (p-value range from 0.00 to 0.02). For 
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example, for FE5 group, the difference in return between the highest attention group and 
the lowest attention group is 1.5%, significant at p=0.01 level.  
In Table 6, a similar sorting procedure is used to sort CAR [2, 60] and value of 
forecast errors. In column (7) of Table 6, the difference in PEAD between the highest 
attention group (Q5) and the lowest attention group (Q1) are negative and significant for 
three extreme FE groups (FE1, FE4 and FE5, p-value range from 0.00 to 0.084). The results 
indicate that greater attention on earnings announcement dates reduces subsequent PEAD. 
The finding that the results are only significant in extreme forecast error groups is 
consistent with prior studies on post earnings announcements drift (e.g. Bernard and 
Thomas 1989).  
5.2 Multivariate Analysis: 
To test H3, I first examine whether increased investor attention enhances the price 
reaction to earnings surprises. Specifically, I estimate the association between abnormal 
investor attention measured by social media data and Earnings Response Coefficients 
(ERC). Next I examine whether increased investor attention reduces post earnings 
announcements drift (PEAD). Following prior studies (e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet), I 
estimate the following regression model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 [𝑖, 𝑗]𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1SUE × Attention +  𝛽2𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 +  𝛽6𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽12𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦+𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (3) 
CARk(i,j) is defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return for stock k 
from day i to day j, and the benchmark return of firm k’s matched portfolio based on size 
and market-to-book ratio. Benchmark portfolio is formed following 25 portfolios sorted on 
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5 size and 5 market-to-book ratio ranks, benchmark return is acquired from Kenneth 
French’s data library. SUE is the median of the most recent forecasts from individual 
analysts made within the last 45 days relative the earnings announcement date acquired 
from the I/B/E/S, normalized by the stock price at the end of the corresponding quarter 
(Kothari, 2001).   I also include controls used in previous studies, for example, Market-to-
Book ratio (Skinner and Sloan 2002), number of analyst following and firms’ Beta estimate 
from the market model. Industry and year fixed effects are also included to control for 
heterogeneous difference among industries and years. 
The results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) reports the results from estimating 
an unrestricted regression model without control variables. Consistent with my prediction, 
the coefficient on the interaction term between SUE and attention is positive at 2.159 and 
significant at the 1% level. Column (2) controls for other known factors that might affect 
ERC, the coefficient of the interaction term between SUE and attention is positive at 2.256 
and significant at the 1% level. Results in both Column (1) and Column (2) indicate that 
investor attention is positively related to the instant market price reaction to earnings 
surprises, i.e. the ERC, suggesting that higher levels of investor attention allow investors 
to faster process the new information incorporated in earnings announcements at a higher 
speed and thus enhance the price discovery around earnings announcements.  
Column (3) reports the cumulative abnormal returns for post earnings 
announcement period from day 2 to day 60. The coefficients on the interaction term 
between SUE and attention is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
investor attention to firms’ earnings announcements reduces the post earnings 
announcement drift. When investors allocate more attention to an earnings announcement, 
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more information is processed immediately, so there is less of a delayed prices response, 
i.e. less post earnings announcements drift (PEAD).  
6. Further Analysis 
6.1 Subsample Analysis: ERC and PEAD for Low Attention Firms and High 
Attention Firms 
By focusing on the number of same-day earnings announcements, Hirshleifer et al. 
(2009) implicitly assume that firms are equally distracting from each other. As a result, 
earnings announcements made on a busy day receive less attention than those made on an 
easy day. In this study, because I have access to a direct measure of investor attention, I 
can relax this assumption and test if different firms are more or less distracting. I consider 
the possibility that investors allocate sufficient attention to large firms with better 
information environment (as tested in Hypothesis 2). As a result, firms that are ranked 
lower in investors’ order of information processing receive insufficient attention and may 
suffer a lower ERC and a higher PEAD. Accordingly, I expect lower ERC and higher 
PEAD for firms that are likely to be ranked lower in investors’ order of information 
processing. In contrast, firms that receives higher investor attention should have higher 
ERC and less or even no PEAD.  
The results are reported in Table 8.  I separate firms into a high attention group (5th 
quintile) and a low attention group (1st quintile). Results in column (2) show that there is 
no significant PEAD for firms with the highest level of attention around earnings 
announcements. In contrast, there is significant PEAD for firms with the lowest level of 
attention around earnings announcements. Taken together, the subsample analysis suggests 
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that PEAD is concentrated in firms whose earnings announcements do not attract enough 
attention. However, for firms that attract the higher level of attention, same-day earnings 
announcements have minimal impact on their price discovery around earnings 
announcements, resulting in no PEAD for these firms.  
6.2 Robustness to Alternative Measure of Investor Attention 
An alternative explanation for my findings can be stated as follow: earnings 
announcements are related to an increased amount of news articles. On the one hand, news 
articles serve a supplement for the interpretation of investors (Li, Shen and Ramesh, 2011), 
thus increased number of news articles might affect the price discovery process around 
earnings announcements. On the other hand, news articles could stimulate tweeting 
activities on social media, so the effect of attention measured by social media on price 
discovery process could be driven by news articles and not by attention per se. That is, 
news article might be a correlated omitted variable that is driving my findings.  
In order to address this concern, I adopt an alternative measure of investor attention: 
I measure attention as the cumulative twitting volume in the 5-day window prior to earning 
announcements. Because most news articles related to an earnings announcement are 
released after the earnings announcements dates (on average 90%, according to Factiva 
dataset), tweeting volume prior to earnings announcements are not directly associated with 
news releases around earnings announcements. Adopting the alternative proxy for investor 
attention, my empirical results hold in both sign and significant levels. 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
Investor attention has significant impact on capital markets; however, researchers 
have not been able to directly observe investor attention. Empirical studies have relied on 
indirect measures to study the variation of attention and its impact on the stock market. 
Indirect measures of investor attention are based on maintained assumption and, as a result, 
tests using these indirect measures are joint tests of maintained assumptions and testing 
hypothesis.  
In this paper, I proposed a new and direct measure of investor attention based upon 
social media data. Specifically, I use investors’ twitting activities on Stocktwits.com, the 
most popular investment-related social media network in the US, to develop direct 
measures of: market-level aggregated attention to the stock market, and firm-level specific 
attention. With these direct measures of investor attention, I provide evidence that investor 
attention to the market varies across time: investors pay more attention to the stock market 
during earnings season. My results also suggest that investor attention is not different on 
Friday compared to other weekdays - a long-debating empirical question. In addition, I 
provide new evidence on how investors allocate their attention among competing earnings 
announcements: larger firms and firms with better information environment attract more 
attention. Finally, I test whether attention measured by social media is related to market 
pricing of earnings information. I show that attention is positively related to ERC and 
negatively related to PEAD, suggesting that attention on social media enhances the 
processing of information in earnings announcements.  
This paper makes three main contributions: First I propose a direct measures of 
investor attention based upon social media data. Unlike indirect measure of investor 
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attention, these direct measures do not rely on any maintained assumptions, and thus can 
be used in a wider range of potential studies. Unlike other internet-based attention measure, 
this measure has better identification of reference and provides cross-sectional 
comparability. Second, I provide direct evidence that investor attention is not different on 
Friday compared with other weekdays. I also document a seasonal variation in investor 
attention to the market: investors pay more attention to the stock market during earnings 
season. Third, this paper adds to the literature on the effect of social media on stock markets: 
I show that investors’ tweeting activity on social media is significantly associated with 
market’s pricing of earnings news.
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This figure displays the monthly market attention measured by total stock-related tweeting volume (relative to the five month rolling average).  
Earnings season is defined as the first month following the common fiscal quarter end, “January, April, July and Oct”, according to my data, 87% of all US firms 
disclose quarterly earnings announcements in one of the four earnings season.  Non-Earnings season are months other than the earnings season month denoted 
above. 
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics for Regression in Table 2 
 
Table 1B: Summary Statistics for Variables in Table 3 to Table 6 
This table presents descriptive statistics for information search and control variables. The sample period is 
between July 1st 2009 and Dec 30th 2013, with non-trading dates excluded. Variable definitions are available 
in Appendix A, all market data (except CAR and SUE) are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
  
Variable No. 
Of Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Q50 Q75 
       
Attention (Market) 766 0.951 0.013 0.63 0.85 1.457 
Friday 766 0.199 0.400 0 0 0 
Earnings Season 766 0.318 0.466 0 0 1 
Absolute Value of 
S&P500 Daily Return 
766 0.0698 0.00738 0.0001 0.0003 0.06663 
Number of Earnings 
Announcements 
766 3.419 1.252 0.693 3.466 5.898 
Number of Earnings 
Surprises 
766 1.465 0.252 0.344 1.211 2.465 
Number of Earnings 
Surprises 
766 6.252 2.266 3.922 5.877 7.622 
Total Size of 
Announcers 
766 11.887 1.255 7.566 10.445 19.030 
Variable No. 
Of Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Q50 Q75 
       
Attention (Firm) 60,519 0.733 1.017 0 1.098 1.757 
SUE 60,519 -0.004 0.009 -0.03 0.01 0.06 
CAR[0,+1] 60,519 -0.000 0.071 -0.037 -0.001 0.036 
CAR[2+60] 60,519 -0.001 0.043 -0.064 -0.001 0.062 
Ln_Size 60,519 7.207 1.856 5.866 7.145 8.372 
Analyst Following 60,519 8.62 8.61  2.00 5.00 13.00 
Market to Book Ratio 60,519 3.12 4.13 1.54 2.38 3.79 
R&D Intensity 60,519 0.25 0.5 0 0 1 
Firm Age 60,519 2.512 0.631 2.079 2.708 2.996 
Firm Beta 60,519 1.212 0.355 0.751 1.108 1.565 
Media Coverage 60,519 6.252 2.266 3.922 5.877 7.622 
Age-Squared 60,519 5.024 1.261 4.159 5.416 5.991 
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Table 1C: Market Attention: Friday and Other-weekday, Earnings season and Non-
Earnings season 
 
Total 
Attention 
to the 
market 
Friday Other 
Weekday 
Difference 
(Other 
Weekday-
Friday) 
t-Stat/z-Stat 
Earnings 
Season 
Non-
Earnings 
Season 
Difference(Earnings 
Season-Non-
Earnings Season) 
t-Stat/z-Stat 
Mean 9,507 9,750 0.3553 
(0.7224) 
11,056 7,566 6.551*** 
(0.000) 
Median 5,342 5,823 0.444 
(0.6570) 
6,445 5,151 4.121*** 
(0.001) 
No. of 
Obs 
209 834  349 694  
This table presents the Univariate result of time variation of total attention to the stock market by 1) Friday 
and Other weekdays 2) Earnings Season and Non-Earnings Season. FRIDAY is a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the date is Friday. EARNINGS SEASON is a dummy variable that equals to one if the date 
is in one of the following earnings peak months: January, April, July and October.  T-test is used to test the 
difference of Mean between two groups, Wilcox test is used to test the difference on Median between two 
groups.  
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Table 2 
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Table of Variables 
 
This table presents Spearman (Above) and Pearson (Below) correlations between firm specific characteristics for the sample. Variable definitions are available in 
Appendix A, all market data (except CAR and FE) are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Correlation coefficients with significant level of >0.05 is displayed, 
otherwise omitted. 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
  1 Attention  0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02   0.02 -0.01  0.33 0.32 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.35  
2 CAR[0,+1] 0.08  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.20  0.23 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.21  0.21 0.35 -0.22 0.02  
3 CAR[+2,60] 0.04 0.06  1.00 1.00 -0.04 -0.10  0.21 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.59 -0.22 0.01 0.01 
4 FE 0.03 0.18 0.07  1.00 -0.04 -0.10 0.29  0.11  0.09     -0.01 0.04 
5 Friday    0.76  -0.03 -0.10  0.21 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.12 -0.04 -0.45 0.30   
6 Earnings Season 0.13 0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.10  0.20 0.14 0.14 0.13  0.04 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.08  0.12 
7 News Article 0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.55 0.11 0.15  0.20 0.15 0.28 0.24 0.32 0.18  0.02 -0.01   
8 Number of EA 0.01  0.08 0.26 0.21 0.01 0.19  0.10 0.18 0.20 0.33   -0.24 0.21 0.18 0.00 
9 Number of Surprise  0.05 0.08 0.02   0.24 0.04  0.19 0.13 0.11 0.14   0.08  0.01 
10 Size of Announcers 0.12 0.02 -0.06  -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.03  0.03 0.05 0.20 0.12 -0.23 0.08 -0.01 -0.00 
11 SP500 Return 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.03 -0.05 0.16 0.20  -0.03  0.19  0.19 -0.21    
12 Market Trading Vol 0.22  0.00 0.11 0.01  0.16  0.01 -0.02 0.23  0.24 0.32 0.01 -0.13  0.01 
13 BtoM  0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06  0.26 -0.32 0.10   
14 Size 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 0.31 0.28 0.07 -0.02 0.58 0.44 0.05  0.09 -0.08   
15 Media Coverage 0.18  -0.01 -0.26 0.08  -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.12  -0.28    0.30  
16 R&D Intensity 0.01 -0.01 0.26 0.20 0.06  0.16 -0.04 -0.01  0.06 0.12 0.05 0.40     
17 Analyst Following 0.07 0.16  0.06  0.03   0.06    0.01 0.13 0.38    
18 Leverage  0.13  0.12  -0.04   0.03  0.05 0.11   0.09  0.15  
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Table 3 Determinants of Daily Market Attention Endowment 
(Test of H1a & H1b) 
 
Dependent Variable: Daily Market 
Attention (de-trended) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Predicte
d Sign 
Coefficient 
 (t-Statistics) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Friday (Dummy) ? 0.028  0.013 
  (0.96)  (1.01) 
Earnings_Season (Dummy) +  0.097*** 0.121*** 
   (6.73) (7.72) 
Absolute Value of S&P500 Daily Return + 0.043*** 0.033** 0.016* 
  (4.66) (2.11) (1.68) 
Number of Earnings Surprises + 0.021 0.011 0.022* 
  (1.35) (1.14) (1.69) 
Number of News Articles + 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 
  (6.23) (4.95) (5.52) 
Number of Earnings Announcements + 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 
  (5.84) (3.79) (3.71) 
Total Size of Announcers + 0.070 0.134 0.012*** 
  (1.15) (1.22) (3.04) 
NYSE+NASDAQ Daily Trading Volume + 0.023*** 0.023** 0.025** 
  (4.77) (2.10) (2.19) 
Intercept  -0.121*** -0.097** -0.106*** 
  (-5.22) (-2.19) (-4.22) 
Year Fixed Effect   YES YES YES 
N  766 766 766 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.242 0.221 0.285 
 
This table presents the determinants of Daily market attention endowment on the event day. Dependent 
Variable is the total market attention measured by total number of stock-related tweets. FRIDAY is a 
dummy variable, set to 1 if event day is Friday, set to 0 otherwise. EARNINGS_SEASON is a dummy 
variable, set to 1 if the event day is in any of the following months (January, April, July and October), 0 
otherwise. NUMBER OF EARNINGS SURPRISES is the natural log of number of firms that have 
Unexpected Earnings Greater/Lower than 20% of latest analyst consensus. NUMBER OF NEWS 
ARTICLES is the natural log of number of news articles related to the stock market, extracted from 
FACTIVA database. NUMBER OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS is the natural log of number of 
firms that release earnings announcements on event date, collected from IBES database. TOTAL SIZE 
is the natural log of sum of lagged total assets of firms that announces earnings on the event date. Sample 
Period is from Jan 1st 2010 to June 30th, 2013 with non-trading days excluded. 
 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * represents significant at .1 level, ** represents significant at .05 
level, *** represents significant at .01 level. 
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Table 4 Investor Attention Allocation among Competing Earnings 
Announcements 
(Test of H2a & H2b) 
Dependent Variable: Daily 
Abnormal Attention 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables  Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Coefficient 
(t-Statistics) 
Size + 0.272***   0.166*** 
  (7.03)   (5.10) 
Media Coverage +  0.081***  0.066** 
   (4.72)  (2.08) 
Analyst Following +   0.051*** 0.036** 
    (2.77) (2.26) 
      
|SUE| + 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 
  (4.35) (4.69) (4.32) (3.85) 
Book to Market + 0.013 0.024* -0.022 -0.013 
  (1.89) (1.87) (-1.17) (-0.92) 
R&D Intensity + 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.073* 0.068 
  (5.84) (5.71) (1.90) (1.22) 
AGE-Squared + 0.007 0.012 -0.004 0.004 
  (1.15) (1.04) (-1.22) (0.95) 
Past Quarter SUE + 0.023*** 0.015 0.011** 0.022*** 
  (4.77) (0.92) (2.33) (3.31) 
Intercept  -0.221** -0.191*** -0.313** -0.279*** 
  (-2.25) (-3.15) (-2.25) (-2.99) 
      
Year Fixed Effect   YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effect  YES YES YES YES 
      
N  39,272 39,272 39,272 39,272 
Adjusted R-Sqaure  0.221 0.265 0.236 0.277 
 
This table presents the determinants of investor attention allocation to firms that announce earnings on the 
same day.  Dependent variable is the abnormal attention on earnings announcements day calculated (de-
trended) as the difference relative to the same weekdays for six weeks before and six weeks after the EA 
days. SIZE is the natural log of lagged total assets in most recent balance sheet disclosures, MEDIA is the 
natural log of (1+ number of news articles related to a firm), collected from FACTIVA database, 
ANALYST FOLLOWING is the natural log of 1+ latest number of analysts following the firm. SUE is 
the unexpected earnings, standardized by standard deviation for the year. BOOKTOMARKET is the book 
value of equity devided by the book value of equity. R&D intensity is an indicator variable if the ratio of 
R&D expense to total expense falls in the upper quartile of sample firms. Past Quarter SUE is an indicator 
variable, set to 1 if sample firms beat analyst forecast for previous two consecutive quarters. Sample Period 
is Jan 2010 to Dec 2013 with non-trading days excluded. 
 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * represents significant at .1 level, ** represents significant at .05 
level, *** represents significant at .01 level. 
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Table 5 
 
Univariate Result: Short-Window Market Return and Investor Attention 
 
   
Attention Small      Big 
   
 Variables (1) Full 
Sample 
(2) Q1 (3) Q2 (4) Q3 (5) Q4 (6) Q5 (7) Q5-
Q1 
t-Test p-
Value 
 
FE 
Small 
To 
Big 
FE1 -0.023 -0.017 -0.023 -0.022 -0.027 -0.031 -0.008 -4.21 0.000 
FE2 -0.011 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.007 -2.35 0.022 
FE3  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.002  1.56 0.118 
FE4  0.011  0.007  0.008  0.015  0.015  0.019  0.008  3.77 0.000 
FE5  0.022  0.015  0.019  0.019  0.020  0.037  0.015  5.21 0.000 
 FE5-FE1  0.045  0.032  0.042  0.041  0.047  0.057     
 t-Test  31.25  22.66  15.79  11.98  16.46  22.35     
 p-Value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    
 
This table present the Univariate relationship between CAR and Attention. Number reported are Median of each Quintile.  
FE1 represents firms with the lowest Forecast Error, and FE5 represents the highest. FE is the forecast error, measured by 
difference between announced EPS reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings forecast, defined as the median of the 
most recent forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape, normalized by the stock price at end of 
corresponding quarters (Kothari, 2001).  Attention is the abnormal attention on earnings announcements day calculated 
(de-trended) as the difference relative to the same weekdays for six weeks before and six weeks after the EA days.  
t-statistics and corresponding p-value are reported, number in bold indicate significant at 0.05 level. 
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Table 6 
 
Univariate Result: Long-window Market Return and Investor Attention 
 
   
Attention Small      Big 
   
 Variables (8) Full 
Sample 
(9) Q1 (10) Q2 (11) Q3 (12) Q4 (13) Q5 (14) Q5-
Q1 
t-Test p-
Value 
 
FE 
Small 
To 
Big 
FE1 -0.001  0.000  0.000 -0.001 -0.002  0.000 -0.001 -2.21 0.026 
FE2  0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.001 -1.44 0.202 
FE3  0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.002  0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -1.06 0.446 
FE4  0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.014  0.004  0.003  0.005  1.77 0.084 
FE5  0.006  0.003  0.004  0.006  0.002  0.003  0.001  3.21 0.000 
 FE5-FE1  0.007  0.003  0.004  0.007  0.004  0.003     
 t-Test  1.780  6.660  0.752  0.892  1.460  0.232    
 p-Value  0.085  0.000  0.548  0.622  0.201  0.855    
This table present the Univariate relationship between CAR (PEAD) and Attention. Number reported are Median of each 
Quintile.  FE1 represents firms with the lowest Forecast Error, and FE5 represents the highest. FE is the forecast error, 
measured by difference between announced EPS reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings forecast, defined as the 
median of the most recent forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape, normalized by the stock price at 
end of corresponding quarters (Kothari, 2001).  Attention is the abnormal attention on earnings announcements day 
calculated (de-trended) as the difference relative to the same weekdays for six weeks before and six weeks after the EA 
days.  
t-statistics and corresponding p-value are reported, number in bold indicate significant at 0.10 level. 
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Table 7: Investor Attention, ERC and PEAD 
(Test of H3) 
  CAR[0,1] - ERC CAR[0,1] - ERC CAR[2,60]- PEAD 
Variables Coef t-Stat Coef t-Stat Coef t-Stat 
Test Variable       
SUE x Attention 2.159*** 3.686 2.256*** 3.455 -1.310** 2.515 
Investor attention 1.945*** 2.844 1.776*** 2.165  -1.640* 1.961 
Standard Unexpected 
Earnings 
4.375*** 7.270 4.245*** 10.355   2.489*** 6.794 
       
Control Variable       
Size    0.001 0.159 -0.041  -0.725 
Analyst Following    0.009 0.465 -0.000 -0.128 
MtoB Ratio     0.005*** 2.961  0.008*   2.066  
Leverage    0.046 0.199  0.011*  1.975 
R&D    0.055*** 3.478 -0.038** -2.561 
Firm Age    0.014 0.568  0.029   0.451 
Beta   -0.012* -1.955 -0.013 -0.128 
       
Intercept -0.646*** -5.694 -0.255*** -5.44 -0.352 -0.899 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes 
N  60,519  60,519  60,519 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.082  0.102  0.026 
 
Attention is the abnormal attention on earnings announcements day calculated (de-trended) as the difference relative 
to the same weekdays for six weeks before and six weeks after the EA days.  CARk(i,j) is defined as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return for stock k from day i to day j, and the benchmark return of firm k’s matched 
portfolio based on size and market-to-book ratio. Benchmark portfolio is formed following 25 portfolios sorted on 5 
size and 5 market-to-book ratio ranks, benchmark return is acquired from Kenneth French’s data library. SUE is 
difference between announced EPS reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings forecast, defined as the median 
of the most recent forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape, normalized by the stock price at 
end of corresponding quarters (Kothari, 2001).  SIZE is the natural log of lagged total assets in most recent balance 
sheet disclosures.  BOOKTOMARKET is the book value of equity divided by the book value of equity. R&D 
intensity is an indicator variable if the ratio of R&D expense to total expense falls in the upper quartile of sample 
firms.  ANALYST FOLLOWING is the natural log of 1+ latest number of analysts following the firm. LEVERAGE 
is the ratio of long term liability to total assets from most recent balance sheet disclosures. 
 FIRM AGE is the age of firm i , measured as the number of years since firm’s IPO year. BETA is firm i‘s beta 
decile ranking in quarter q earnings announcement per CRSP. Industry classification used 2-digit SIC code.  
 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. * represents significant at .1 level, ** represents significant at .05 level, *** 
represents significant at .01 level. 
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Table 8: ERC and PEAD for High Attention Firms and Low Attention Firms 
  CAR[0,1] CAR[2,60] 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign Coeffecient t-Stat 
Predicted 
Sign Coeffecient t-Stat 
Panel A: High Attention (5th Quintile)             
Standard Unexpected Earnings + 2.686*** 2.844 ? 0.364 1.261 
Investor attention + 1.110*** 7.270 + 0.044 0.794 
Intercept   -0.2159*** -3.686  -0.013*** -3.515 
       
Year Fixed Effect           
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
N   12,104     12,104   
Adjusted R-Squared   0.098     0.026   
Panel B: Low Attention (1st Quintile)             
Standard Unexpected Earnings + 2.016** 2.343 + 1.066*** 2.701 
Investor attention + 0.576*** 7.744 - -0.012 -0.726 
Intercept   -0.032*** 3.258  -0.024*** 3.398 
       
Year Fixed Effect           
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
N   12,104     12,104   
Adjusted R-Squared   0.099     0.015   
This table presents the ERC and PEAD for both high Attention firms and Low attention firms; High Attention is defined as abnormal attention falls into the 
5th quintile on the earnings announcement date; Low Attention is defined as abnormal attention falls into the 1st quintile on the earnings announcements date.  
CARk(i,j) is defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return for stock k from day i to day j, and the benchmark return of firm k’s matched 
portfolio based on size and market-to-book ratio. Benchmark portfolio is formed following 25 portfolios sorted on 5 size and 5 market-to-book ratio ranks, 
benchmark return is acquired from Kenneth French’s data library. SUE is difference between announced EPS reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings 
forecast, defined as the median of the most recent forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape, normalized by the stock price at end of 
corresponding quarters (Kothari, 2001).  This test includes the same set of control variables as Table 7. 
* represents significant at .1 level, ** represents significant at .05 level, *** represents significant at .01 level 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions Source 
Attention (Market) Market Attention is measured by total number of stock-
related tweets posted on Stocktwits website. Market 
Attention is de-trended by scaling total number of tweet 
daily with the total number of active users.  
StockTwits 
API 
Attention (Firm) Firm Attention is measure by number of investment 
related tweets that are labeled with a specific firm. To 
control for a the difference in firms’ inherent attention, 
this measure of attention is de-trended by subtracting 
the 4 week ahead, and 4 week after daily attention on 
the same weekday.   
*In Robustness test, an alternative measure of investor 
attention based on the number of tweets activity PRIOR 
to EA are used to eliminate the impact News Articles. 
StockTwits 
API 
CAR[i,j] CARk(i,j) is defined as the difference between the 
buy-and-hold return for stock k from day i to day j, 
and the benchmark return of firm k’s matched portfolio 
based on size and market-to-book ratio. Benchmark 
portfolio is formed following 25 portfolios sorted on 5 
size and 5 market-to-book ratio ranks, benchmark 
return is acquired from Kenneth French’s data library. 
CRSP 
Forecast Error/ 
Standard Unexpected 
Earnings (SUE) 
FE/ SUE is difference between announced EPS 
reported by I/B/E/S and the consensus earnings 
forecast, defined as the median of the most recent 
forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S 
detail tape, normalized by the stock price at end of 
corresponding quarters (Kothari, 2001). 
I/B/E/S, 
CRSP 
NYSE+NASDAQ 
Daily Trading Volume 
Sume of Trading Volume from NYSE and Nasdaqu 
Combined 
CRSP 
Absolute Value of S&P 
500 Daily Change 
Absolute Value of S&P 500 Index Daily Change  CRSP 
Book to Market BOOKTOMARKET is the book value of equity 
devided by the book value of equity. Ratio of book 
value of common equity to market capitalization 
(CEQQ/[PRCCQ * CSHOQ]), If CEQQ is missing, 
book value of common equity will be calculated as 
ATQ-LTQ 
Compustat/ 
CRSP 
Size The natural log of lagged total assets in most recent 
balance sheet disclosures 
Compustat 
Rank of Size The decile rank of Size, scaled to range between 0 and 
1. 
Compustat 
Media Coverage MEDIA is the natural log of (1+ number of news 
articles related to a firm), collected from FACTIVA 
database 
Factiva 
R&D Intensity R&D intensity is an indicator variable if the ratio of 
R&D expense to total expense falls in the upper 
quartile of sample firms. 
Compustat 
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Analyst Following ANALYST FOLLOWING is the natural log of 1+ 
latest number of analysts following the firm. 
I/B/E/S 
FRIDAY FRIDAY is a dummy variable, set to 1 if event day is 
Friday, set to 0 otherwise. 
I/B/E/S 
Earnings Season EARNINGS_SEASON is a dummy variable, set to 1 if 
the event day is in any of the following months 
(January, April, July and October), 0 otherwise. 
I/B/E/S 
Number of Earnings 
Surprises 
NUMBER OF EARNINGS SURPRISES is the natural 
log of number of firms that have Unexpected Earnings 
Greater/Lower than 20% of latest analyst consensus. 
I/B/E/S 
Number of News 
Articles 
NUMBER OF NEWS ARTICLES is the natural log of 
number of news articles related to the stock market, 
extracted from FACTIVA database. 
Factiva 
Number of Earnings 
Announcments 
NUMBER OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS is 
the natural log of number of firms that release earnings 
announcements on event date, collected from IBES 
database. 
I/B/E/S 
Total Size of 
Announcers 
TOTAL SIZE is the natural log of sum of lagged total 
assets of firms that announces earnings on the event 
date. 
Compustat/ 
IBES 
LEVERAGE LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term liability to total 
assets from most recent balance sheet disclosures. 
Compustat 
Beta BETA is firm i ‘s beta decile ranking in quarter q 
earnings announcement per CRSP 
CRSP 
Industry Dummy 2-digit SIC classification Compustat 
Firm Age FIRM AGE is the age of firm i , measured as the 
number of years since firm’s IPO year. 
Compustat 
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Essay 2 
Do Public Disclosures Level the Informational Playing Field between Sophisticated 
and Unsophisticated Investors? Evidence from an Investor Social Media Network 
1. Introduction 
The stock market is comprised of investors of varying levels of sophistication. 
Differences in investors’ ability in collecting and analyzing information can result in an 
uneven informational playing field (i.e. information asymmetry) between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors. The resulting adverse selection problem can have important 
economic consequences in terms of increasing firms’ cost of capital (e.g. Watts and 
Zimmerman 1979, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). Additionally, sophisticated investors’ information advantage can enable 
them to profit from trading against unsophisticated investors, thus compromising the 
fairness of the stock market (see Lev 1988). As a result of such concerns, securities 
regulators have adopted many policies to “level the informational playing field” across all 
investors, including the adoption of disclosure policies designed to ensure that all investors 
have equal access to public disclosures.1  
However, there is little direct evidence as to whether or not public disclosures serve 
                                                          
1 Based upon the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
enacted a disclosures regime that is designed to level the informational playing field among investors. Indeed, 
in 1998, former Chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt remarked that “the statutes establishing our regulatory 
system championed the idea of the level playing field.” Similarly, regarding the purpose of the U.S. 
mandatory disclosure regime, Lev (1988) observed that the “adverse consequences of inequity can be 
mitigated by a public policy mandating the disclosure of financial information in order to reduce information 
asymmetries.” More recently, the SEC adopted regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) aimed at “leveling the 
informational playing field” among different types of investors by curbing firms’ practice of selective 
disclosing to a subset of investors. 
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to “level the informational playing field” between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors; in part, this is because we lack direct measures of the degree of information 
asymmetry between these two classes of investors. This paper seeks to address this gap in 
the literature. In this paper, I develop a direct new measure of information asymmetry 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, and I use this new measure to test the 
effect of unanticipated firm-provided public disclosures on the degree of information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
 The role of public disclosures in leveling the informational playing field between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors is complex. On the one hand, public disclosures 
can reveal to unsophisticated investors (i.e. uninformed traders) information that was 
previously possessed only by sophisticated investors (i.e. informed traders), thus leveling 
the informational playing field between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1991, Atiase and Bamber 1994). On the other hand, studies that focus on 
sophisticated investors’ greater ability to analyze public disclosures (e.g., Kim and 
Verrecchia 1994, 1997, Bamber et al. 1999) suggest that, compared to unsophisticated 
investors, sophisticated investors can better interpret the information provided by public 
disclosures to generate new private information. In this case public disclosures can 
potentially serve to increase the information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors, at least in the short run (Kim and Verrecchia 1997). To date 
however we have little direct empirical evidence that speaks to whether or not public 
disclosures serve to level the informational playing field between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors, in large part because we lack a direct measure of the degree of 
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information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.2 
 In this study, I use social media data to develop a new and direct measure of 
information asymmetry (see below) between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
Using this new measure, I examine the impact of public disclosures on the degree of 
information asymmetry between these two classes of investors. I focus on sporadic 
management forecasts (management forecasts that are not made within +/- 3-days of a 
scheduled earnings announcements, or made on a regular scheduled basis) for the following 
reasons: First, these forecasts are usually unanticipated by investors, therefore eliminating 
the impact of private information search activities specifically in anticipation of an 
scheduled disclosure (see Kim and Verrecchia 1991b) on information asymmetry, 
providing for a cleaner setting to test the impact of public disclosure per se on the 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Second, 
firms issue management forecasts of varying levels of precision (i.e., point vs. range 
forecasts, see Baginski et al. 1993), allowing for empirical tests of how public disclosures 
of varying precision affect information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors.3  
 This new measure is constructed using investor-generated statements posted on 
StockTwits.com, the most popular social media network dedicated to investment activity 
in the U.S.4 On this platform, investors can post short discussions (of up to 140 characters), 
                                                          
2 Trade size has been widely used as a proxy for investor sophistications. However, recent studies (Cready et 
al. 2014 and Frazzini et al. 2012) call into question the validity of using trade size to infer investor 
sophistications, by showing that highly professional investors actively and strategically separate large trading 
orders into small sized trades, making trade-size a noisy (even biased) proxy of investor sophistication. 
3 In Contrast, it’s more difficult to identify the level of precision for earnings announcements. 
4 As of July of 2014, Stocktwits has more than 600,000 active users, and an average monthly volume of more 
than 3 million tweets. And according to Stocktwits, “the posts are viewed by an audience of over 40 million 
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known as “tweets,” to express their belief about the investment potential of certain stocks. 
Because these tweets are posted directly by individual investors, researchers can potentially 
use measures of the content of these tweets to proxy for individual investors’ beliefs about 
the investment value of specific stocks. Additionally, since tweets are being posted almost 
continuously, researchers can use this data to develop relatively high-frequency (i.e., daily) 
measures of investors’ beliefs regarding a specific stock. Applying textual analysis to a 
sample of 11 million stock tweets posted to StockTwits.com between 2009 and 2013 by 
both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, I extract the information content 
(positiveness or negativeness) of these tweets and develop measures of the average beliefs 
of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Specifically, based upon users’ self-
reported sophistication levels, on a daily basis I calculate the mean values of the 
information sets of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors; then, using this data, 
I construct a measure of the information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors as the difference between their average information sets. 
 Before applying my new measure, I conduct a series of tests to establish its 
construct validity. First, I examine the accuracy of the textual analysis at the individual 
tweet level. I show that the textual-analysis based measures of tweet information are 
correlated with: (1) a measure of the in formativeness of tweets that is based upon the tweet 
writer’s own description (i.e., users classify their tweet as “bullish” or “bearish”), and (2) 
a researcher-generated measure of the information in a tweet that is based upon the 
                                                          
across the financial web and social media platforms.”- From introduction of StockTwits.com 
(http://stocktwits.com/about). 
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researchers own reading and categorization of the information in a tweet. 5  Second, I 
confirm the validity of aggregated firm-day level measures of the information content of 
tweets, which is the mean of the information set of tweets related to a given stock. I show 
that firm-day twitter information is positively associated with same-day and next-day 
abnormal returns, and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for up to a week. A long-short 
hedge portfolio based on stocks that fall into the most positive and most negative deciles 
of daily twitter information earns an average annual abnormal return of approximately 7%. 
Finally, I also test the validity of users’ self-reported sophistication levels. I find that users 
of StockTwits who describe themselves as “sophisticated” investors: (1) are followed by 
more users, (2) post more tweets, on average, than other users who identify themselves as 
“unsophisticated,” (3) write significantly longer tweets, (4) use significantly more 
professional financial terms in their tweets, and (5) write tweets that have a stronger ability 
to predict future stock returns.6 Taken together, the results of all of these validity tests 
suggests that the new measure does indeed proxy for the degree of information asymmetry 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 
 Using a sample of 6,426 sporadic management forecasts made by public firms 
during 2009 to 2013, I find that information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors increase in the first week following a management forecast. This 
                                                          
5 Text-based Information: tweet level opinion extracted using bag-of-words method with Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) dictionary. In the correlation analysis, I define tweets with information score in the upper 
(lower) quartile as positive (negative). User-identified Information: when posting a tweet, user can 
voluntarily choose to disclosure her/his opinion on the stock mentioned, by selecting a slider between “bullish” 
or “bearish”. In my sample, approximately 10% of all tweets have this opinion available. Reader-identified 
Information:  In addition, I randomly select 3,000 tweets from the sample. Risk neutral reader reads the tweets 
and assign the tweets into three groups: positive, neutral, negative. 
6 Professional terms are financial and investment terms included in the Dictionary of Financial and Business 
Terms (University of Toronto). I show that opinion of sophisticated investors has higher coefficients in 
predicting CAR of the following five trading days than opinion of unsophisticated investors. For detailed 
classification of investor sophistication, see section 3.2 and Table 6 for detail.  
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is consistent with sophisticated investors interpreting more new information from the 
public disclosure (e.g. Kim and Verrecchia 1994) than do unsophisticated investors. I also 
find that from the second week following the management forecast, information 
asymmetry decreases to a level that is lower than the pre-disclosure level, consistent with 
management forecasts leveling the informational playing field between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors, in longer term. Finally, I find that, compared to less precise range 
forecasts, more precise point forecasts result in less of an increase in information 
asymmetry in the short term (the first week), but result in a larger long term reduction in 
information asymmetry (from the second week following the management forecast). This 
finding indicates that more precise management forecasts serve to alleviate information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. More precise forecasts 
provide less scope for sophisticated investors to trigger relatively more private information, 
thus limiting the extent to which the public disclosure result in a short-term increase in 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors (e.g. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia 1990, Lambert et al. 2007). 
 This study makes a number of contributions. First, I develop, validate, and 
demonstrate the use of a new measure of information asymmetry between sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors.  The new measure is based upon measures of investors’ 
information that are extracted from an analysis of investors’ directly observable tweets (in 
which investors express their beliefs regarding the investment value of specific stocks). 
The new measure avoids potential identification errors associated with using market 
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aggregates such as bid-ask spread or trade size.7 Instead, the new measure is based upon 
investors’ beliefs as expressed in their tweets. The new measure also has distinct 
advantages compared to using analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for investors’ information. 
The new measure is based upon investors’ self-expressed views and, as such, does not 
require the assumption that sell-side analysts can proxy for investors. Additionally, the new 
measure does not require a firm to have a large analyst following and is therefore more 
general than analyst-based proxies for investors’ information. In addition, the new measure 
can be used to generate data of a far higher frequency (i.e., daily basis) than can analyst-
based proxies.  
Second, this study shows that: (1) information asymmetry between sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors increases in the short-term, i.e., for one week, following 
public disclosures-specifically, management forecasts; (2) information asymmetry 
decreases thereafter, i.e., a week after the public disclosure; and (3) more precise public 
disclosures result in a smaller short-term increase, and a larger long-term decrease in 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. These results 
contribute to a number of literatures: First, the results provide new evidence that 
management forecasts increase information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors in the short term but decrease information asymmetry in the 
longer term. Second, the results provide new evidence that sophisticated and 
                                                          
7 Bid-Ask spread is subject to the impact of transaction cost, and it includes both information asymmetry 
within sophisticated (or unsophisticated) investors and information asymmetry between the two groups (see 
Hasbrouck, 1991 for a discussion). Cready et al. (2014) and Frazzini et al. (2012) call into question the 
validity of using trade size to infer investor sophistications by showing that highly professional investors 
actively and strategically separate large trading orders into small sized trades, making trade-size a noisy proxy 
of investor sophistication. 
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unsophisticated investors interpret public disclosures differently in the short-term. Third, 
the results show that more precise public disclosures serve to “level the informational 
playing filed” between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  
 Finally, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the role of social media 
in the capital markets. My finding that the average information contained in StockTwits 
predicts future abnormal returns indicates that social media data contains useful 
information that is not fully incorporated by other channels. Additionally, compared to 
other measures of investors’ use of the internet to search for firm-related information, 
social media provides researchers a lens to observe investor-generated content that 
presumably reflects their beliefs. Social media analysis therefore offers scope for studies 
of investors’ information processing and transmission at an individual investor level.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a summary 
of relevant literature, the institutional background and hypothesis development. Section III 
discusses the construction of my new measure of information asymmetry using StockTwits 
data, the validity tests of this new measure, and the construction of other financial data. 
Section IV describes the study design.  Section V reports the main empirical results. 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
2. Backgrounds and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Measuring Information Asymmetry between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated 
Investors 
 The role of investor sophistication in determining market reactions to financial 
disclosures has been extensively studied in both the accounting and finance literatures. In 
55 
 
particular, studies show that sophisticated and unsophisticated investor are asymmetrically 
informed and that they process public disclosures differently. For example, Wather (1997) 
and Ayers et al. (2011) show that when forming their earnings expectations, sophisticated 
investors primarily rely on analyst forecasts, while unsophisticated investors primarily rely 
on last year’s earnings. Studies also show that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors 
respond differently to public disclosures, resulting in a series of market consequences, 
including abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements (Utama and Cready 
1997), mispricing of accruals (Ali et al. 2000, Collins et al. 2003), and variation in earnings 
response coefficients (Bartov et al. 2000).   
 Because researchers cannot directly observe the information sets of sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors, existing studies rely on indirect proxies for the degree of 
information asymmetry derived from aggregate market-level data. In particular, trade size 
has been widely used as a proxy for the (unobserved) level of sophistication of investors—
under the assumption that sophisticated investors are more likely to execute larger trades 
due to their relatively larger holdings (e.g. Miller 2010, Ayers et al. 2011). However, recent 
studies (Cready et al. 2014, Frazzini et al. 2012) call into question the validity of these 
inferences by showing that highly professional investors actively and strategically execute 
large trades by splitting them into many small trades (with the help of computerized trading 
system), making trade-size a noisy, and possibly biased, proxy for investor sophistication. 
Such wide-spread strategic trading behavior by institutional (sophisticated) investors 
obviously renders trade size a questionable proxy for investor sophistication.   
 Investor-related social media networks offer an alternative means of developing 
proxies for the beliefs of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Social media 
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provides individual investors with a platform to express and exchange their opinions about 
the investment value of stocks by posting short discussions known as “tweets.” These 
investor-generated statements that reflect investors’ beliefs about the investment value of 
stocks can be used to develop measures of investors’ information. Using data from 
StockTwits.com which contains self-reported data for investors’ sophistication levels, I 
textually analyze the tweets of both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors and 
construct direct measures of the average beliefs of both groups of investors. Using these 
measures of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors’ information, I then develop a 
direct measure of information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors.  
 Traditional proxies for information asymmetry (such as bid-ask spread, probability 
of informed trading-PIN, etc.) are constructed based upon market-level trading data, and 
are thus subject to potential noise arising from transaction costs (see Hasbrouck, 1991 for 
a discussion). These measures also capture both information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors (between-group information asymmetry), and 
the effects of any information heterogeneity within each group (within-group information 
asymmetry).  Using the directly observed tweets of both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors I generate measures of the information content of both groups and, from these 
measures of information content, I create a new measure of the information asymmetry 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors that is directly based upon investor-
generated statements. 
2.2 Public Disclosures and Leveling the Informational Playing Field 
 Information asymmetry occurs when 1) informed investors possess private 
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information about the firm’s value while uninformed investors only have access to public 
information, or\and 2) investors possess private information of different precision. 
Information asymmetry is costly to firms as its presence creates an adverse selection 
problem in the stock market. When investors with superior information trade on the basis 
of their private information, investors at an information disadvantage will seek price-
protect, thus increases firms’ cost of capital (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Kyle 1989; 
Lambert and Verrecchia 2010). Information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors is also of concern to regulators as it creates an uneven 
informational playing field, potentially compromising market fairness (see Lev 1988). 
 While it seems intuitive that public disclosures should reduce information 
asymmetry by making information privately possessed by some investors publicly 
available to all investors, theories suggests that the real impact of public disclosures on 
information asymmetry may not necessarily be so benign. Public disclosures can affect the 
degree of information asymmetry between investors of varying sophistication levels 
through two channels. First, in the pre-disclosure periods sophisticated investors may have 
access to private information that is not available to unsophisticated investors. In this case, 
public disclosures will decrease information asymmetry between heterogeneously 
informed investors by making private information publicly available to all investors (see 
Kim and Verrecchia 1991b). In other words, when public disclosures are released, investors 
of various sophistication levels adjust their information sets towards the public signal, thus 
increasing the commonality of traders’ information and decrease the information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Second, public 
disclosures can potentially cause investors with different information processing skills to 
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generate new private information, resulting in an increase of information asymmetry 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors (Kim and Verrecchia 1994 and 1997, 
and Indjejikian 1991). 
 Earnings announcements have been widely used as a setting to study changes in 
investors’ information around public disclosures. Earnings announcements provide 
significant amounts of information regarding firm value, and are therefore likely to affect 
investors’ information. For example, Lee et al. (1993) shows that bid-ask spreads increase 
around earnings announcements; they argue that earnings announcements trigger private 
information search activities, resulting in an increase in bid-ask spreads. In addition, Yohn 
(1998) shows that bid-ask spreads increase in the four days prior to earnings 
announcements, remain high for earnings announcement days and the days immediately 
following, but bid-ask spreads one week after the earnings announcements are not 
significantly different from the pre-announcement level.  
 However, these results for earnings announcements may not generalize to other 
types of public disclosures, such as management forecasts. First, earnings announcements 
are regular and anticipated disclosures. Theory suggests (e.g. Kim and Verrecchia 1991b) 
that investors specifically collect private information prior to anticipate disclosures, known 
as the anticipation effect. For earnings announcements, it is hard to disentangle the effects 
of pre-announcements information acquisition activity from the effects of announcements 
per se. Also, sophisticated investors’ ability to better interpret the announcements – to 
trigger new private information, as discussed in Kim and Verrecchia 1994 – might be 
because they acquire some private information in anticipation of the announcements. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the anticipation of earnings announcements alone 
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increases information asymmetry as traders search for private information in an attempt to 
profit from the upcoming public disclosure (e.g. Yohn 1998).  
 Second, earnings announcements mainly report confirmatory historical 
performance data (i.e. income statement) and historical values (i.e. balance sheet). 
Although these information is useful in predicting firms’ future performance, it demands a 
higher level of knowledge and skills for investors to correctly interpret in order to form 
beliefs about firms’ future performance. Management forecasts, on the other hand provide 
more precise estimates of firms’ future performance (usually EPS numbers) and require 
less interpretation skills (as EPS numbers are given). As a result of such fundamental 
difference between the two types of announcements, the findings of Yohn (1998) that bid-
ask spreads do not change significantly in the long term following earnings announcements 
may not hold for the case of management forecasts. 
 This study uses sporadic management forecasts as the setting to study the impact 
of public disclosure on the information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors. Sporadic management forecasts are usually unanticipated by 
investors, therefore minimizing the impact of investors searching for private information 
ahead of the disclosure.  In addition, management forecasts offer a cleaner setting to 
identify the level of precision of disclosures (Baginski et al. 1993), allowing for empirical 
tests of how variation in the precision of public disclosures determines the effect of public 
disclosures on the degree of information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors. 
 Ex-ante, it is unclear whether management forecasts would decrease or increase the 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. On the one 
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hand, if management forecasts reveal to unsophisticated investors information that was 
previously only privately possessed by sophisticated investors, then management forecasts 
would reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the two classes of investors. 
On the other hand, if the superior information processing skills of sophisticated investors 
allow them to extract more private information from a management forecast than 
unsophisticated investors, then management forecasts could potentially increase the 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  My first 
hypothesis stated in the null form: 
H1: Information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors does not 
change around the disclosure of sporadic management forecasts.  
 Next, I examine whether the impact of public disclosures on information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors varies with the level of 
precision of the public disclosure. I expect the impact of management forecasts on the 
degree of information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors to 
vary with the level of precision of the management forecast (point vs. range forecast) 
because: First, studies suggest that diversely informed investors update their prevailing 
beliefs to incorporate the public disclosures, and that their belief update is associated with 
the precision of the public disclosure (Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Second, studies show 
that investors interpret public disclosures differently (i.e. differential interpretation of 
disclosure).8 As a result, a less (more) precise public disclosure may provide traders with 
                                                          
8 Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kim and Verrecchia (1997) show that announcements themselves convey 
different things to investors with different sophistication levels. Using analyst forecast data, Barron, Byard 
and Kim (2002) shows that analysts extract or develop private information from the public disclosures. 
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superior information processing skills more (less) scope to trigger new private information, 
as the potential expected payoff from such processing of the public disclosure increased 
(decreased). Following prior studies (e.g. Baginski et al. 1993, Pownall et al. 1993, Hirst 
et al. 2008), I use point management forecast as the proxy for more precise management 
forecast, and range forecast as the proxy for less precise management forecast. My second 
hypothesis, stated in the null form is: 
H2: Point and range management forecasts are associated with the same change in 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.  
3. Data and Sample 
3.1 Construction of Measure of Information Asymmetry between Sophisticated and 
Unsophisticated Investors using Social Media Data 
 Social media provides people with a new platform to express and exchange their 
opinions and ideas with a large number of peers. As such, the rapid development of social 
media networks in recent years can be expected to affect the origination and transmission 
of information to capital markets. Indeed, a number of pioneering studies examine 
investment-related social media networks and provide evidence suggesting that the 
information as expressed on such social media networks has a significant impact on capital 
market.9  
                                                          
9 For example, a recent study in computational science by Bollen et al. (2011) shows that the content of 
Twitter.com predicts future stock returns.  More recently, Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) suggest that the 
information content of Seeking Alpha, a popular investment related blog website, can predict future stock 
price performance. 
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Stocktwits.com is the most popular investment-dedicated social media micro-
blogging website in the US. As of July of 2014, Stocktwits has more than 600,000 active 
users and an average monthly posting volume of more than 3 million tweets. According to 
Stocktwits, the posts “are viewed by an audience of over 40 million across the financial 
web and social media platforms.”10 Stocktwits.com features a platform on which users can 
post a short paragraph of no more than 140 characters-called a tweet- that relates to the 
investment potential of one or more specific stocks. These tweets are then posted to the 
main board of the website as well as specific sub-pages sorted by stock tickers and can be 
viewed by other users.  
 StockTwits.com provides an ideal setting to measure information asymmetry 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors for the following reasons: First, 
StockTwits.com is a venue dedicated to of investment potential of stocks. Tweets posted 
on this website are investment-focused, thus minimizing potential inclusion of noisy or 
tweets that are not investment-related (e.g., consumer-related comments that focus on firms’ 
produces and/or services). Second, investors who post on StockTwits self-report their 
sophistication levels as “Novice, Intermediate or Professional,” allowing for identification 
of information asymmetry between sophisticated (professional) and un-sophisticated 
(novice) investors. And, while self-reported, the StockTwits data also allows for tests of 
the validity of these self-reported investor sophistication levels (see section 3.2 for detail). 
Third, StockTwits.com features a “Cash-tagging” design to clearly identify the ticker each 
tweet refers to, thus enabling the development of programs to clearly extract the company 
                                                          
10 From introduction of StockTwits.com (http://stocktwits.com/about). 
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each post refers to, minimizing the potential for the misclassification of firms which is a 
common among other internet-based data sources. 11   
 In this study, I extracted and textually analyzed 11 million tweets posted between 
July 2009 and December 2013 by around 290,000 identical users.12  First, I carefully 
remove tweets (and re-tweets) posted using the official accounts of news media 
organizations such as NYtimes and WSJ and posts originating from the official StockTwits 
accounts of firms themselves. Then, I textually analyzed the information content of each 
tweet using Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) Financial Sentiment Dictionary and Bag-
of-Words method to classify negative and positive words. I use this dictionary because it 
is specialized in classifying finance-related texts. Loughran and McDonald (2011) shows 
that this dictionary is superior to other non-specialized dictionaries in identifying the tone 
of words used in finance-related texts. Appendix B shows the 15 most frequent positive 
and negative words I extracted from StockTwits.com; as can be seen in Appendix B, these 
words are meaningful in finance-related contexts. Following Antweiler and Frank (2004), 
I calculate the information content of each tweet as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1 + 𝑃
1 + 𝑁
)        (1) 
Where P (N) is the number of positive (negative) words in a tweet. The Information Score 
is a decimal value with high positive values indicating a strong and positive opinion, and 
vice versa. For example, an extremely positive tweet with 30 positive words (tweet has a 
                                                          
11 Each tweets on StockTwits is tagged with the ticker symbol (expressed as $GOOG or $AAPL) that the 
author is referring to, in practice called “Cash-tagging”. This special design provides a mechanism to clearly 
extract the company reference in each post with no misclassification. By searching for the “$”, program can 
automatically extract the ticker each tweet is related to.   
12 I want to thank Chris Corriveau at StockTwits.com for granting me access to StockTwits data and API 
Service. 
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limit of 140 characters) and 0 negative words gets a score of 3.4; an extreme negative tweet 
with 30 negative words and 0 positive words gets a score of -3.4. 13 
 To estimate the information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors, I focus on the tweets posted by “Novice” and “Professional” users.14 I first use 
textual analysis to extract the information score (positiveness or negativeness) of each 
tweet (calculated using formula 1). Then, based upon users self-reported sophistication 
levels, I calculate the mean information sets of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors 
for a given stock. I then construct my new measure of information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors as the absolute value of the difference between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors’ information sets.15 Because I use financial 
data of NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms, following Antweiler and Frank (2004), I align 
tweets posted within the trading hours of 9:30 am to 4:00 pm to the same trading day, and 
tweets made after hour (and pre-market) are matched with the market level data of the next 
trading day. Because these tweets can only have an effect on the market indicators of the 
next trading day.  
3.2 Validity Tests of Social Media Based Information Asymmetry Measures 
 Before proceeding to use my new measure of information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors to examine changes in information asymmetry 
                                                          
13 I show that results are robust to alternative classification methods, including the number of positive words 
in excess of negative words, and scaled by the length of tweets (as shown in table 2b). 
14 In section 3.2 I provide validity test of the self-reported sophistication levels, and In Table 6, I provide 
result of these validity tests. 
15 I require at least five tweets posted by identical sophisticated users and unsophisticated users on the same 
day to calculate the information asymmetry between these two classes of investors. The measures used in the 
validity tests are mean opinion of all investors, and information asymmetry measure used in the validity tests 
is the standard deviation of all tweets by all investors. 
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around firms’ issuance of periodic management forecasts, I first undertake a number of test 
to assess the validity of my new measure of information asymmetry. In order to establish 
the construct validity of my new measure of information asymmetry between sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors, I conduct a series of validity tests to show the validity of: 1) 
the textual analysis of the information content of tweets, 2) the aggregated firm-level 
measure of the information content of tweets, and 3) users’ self-reported levels of 
sophistication.  
 I first examine the validity of the automatic content extraction of tweets. Based up 
the “Bag-of-words” method and Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) Financial Sentiment 
Dictionary, I calculate the information score for each tweet in my sample, which reflects 
the positiveness or negativeness of each tweet. This information extracted from the text of 
the tweet is defined as “text-based information” and is used as the main sample for this 
study. When posting a tweet, users of StockTwits are able to label her/his belief about the 
investment value of the stock mentioned, by selecting a slider between “bullish” or 
“bearish”, this user-supplied indicator represents their beliefs and therefore can be used to 
check the validity of text-based tweets information extraction. In my sample, 
approximately 10% of all tweets have this opinion available, this information is defined as 
“user-identified information”. In addition, I randomly select 3,000 tweets from the sample, 
read these tweets and manually assign the tweets into three groups: positive, neutral, 
negative. This assessment from tweet information from readers’ perspective is defined as 
“reader-identified Information”. 
 Text-based twitter information is compared to user-identified information in Table 
2A. Result shows that, on average, mean text-based information for positive tweets are 
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significantly higher (more positive, p-value=0.00) than for neutral tweets; and the mean 
extracted information for neutral tweets is significantly higher (more positive, p-
value=0.00) than for negative tweets. Table 2B shows that text-based twitter information 
is significantly positively correlated with reader-identified twitter information labeled by 
the readers (correlation coefficient = 0.715) and user-identified information provided by 
the users of StockTwits (correlation coefficient = 0.365). These positive and significant 
correlations validate the textual analysis with bag-of-words method to extract information 
content, which allows for further construction of aggregated firm-level information 
measures. Additionally, variation in the measurement of information is positively 
correlated (all significant at p=0.00 level) with existing proxies for opinion divergence such 
as raw and abnormal return (Miller 1977), and raw and abnormal trading volume (Bamber, 
Barron and Stevens 2011). 
 Next, I examine the relationship between firm-level aggregated twitter information 
and stock performance. In Table 3, I show that aggregated firm-day twitter information is 
positively correlated with contemporaneous abnormal returns, abnormal returns of the next 
trading day, and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for up to five trading days.16 A 
hedge portfolio holding a long position of the most positive decile and a short position of 
the most negative decile of firm-day twitter information earns an average abnormal return 
of 7% annually. These results are robust to the exclusion of trading days around earnings 
                                                          
16 I Estimate the CAR as buy and hold excessive return of a given firm over the benchmark firm matched on 
Size and Book to Market (5x5 groups). The formation of the benchmark portfolio follows instruction on 
Kenneth French’s personal website.  
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announcements.17 As reported in Table 4, after controlling for firm characteristics that may 
contribute to the cross-sectional variation in market performances, firm-day StockTwits 
information is still significantly positively (p-value<0.01) abnormal returns for the next 
trading day, and the cumulative abnormal returns for the following three trading days. 
Similarly, as reported in Table 5, the divergence of opinions among investors following 
the same firm, as measured by the standard deviation of information scores for the 
individual tweets for a given firm on a given day, has a positive and significant coefficient 
in predicting abnormal trading volume for up to five trading days.  
 Third, I examine the validity of user self-reported sophistication levels. I expect 
users with different sophistication levels to have different information about investment 
potential of stocks. As a result, the twitting behaviors should vary across sophistication 
levels, so that tweets posted by users of differing levels of sophistication should differ in 
their abilities in predicting future returns. In Table 6A, I show that in my sample, 55% of 
investors identify themselves as “unsophisticated” and about 14% identify themselves as 
“sophisticated.” Investors who identify themselves as “sophisticated” are followed by more 
users (103 vs. 12 followers, on average) and, on average, sophisticated investors post more 
tweets (294 vs. 85 tweets) per year than investors who identify themselves as 
“unsophisticated.” Tweets by “sophisticated” investors are significantly longer, and 
contains more professional terms.18 These differences in the tweeting behavior of self-
reported sophisticated and unsophisticated investors are all significantly different at 
                                                          
17 Studies show that unsophisticated investors may potentially contribute to post-earnings announcements 
drift (e.g. Hirshleifer et al. 2008). To eliminate the possible impact of PEAD, I exclude the trading days 
around earnings announcements to show the robustness to the exclusion of earnings announcements events.  
18 Professional terms are financial and investment terms included in the Dictionary of Financial and Business 
Terms (University of Toronto). 
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conventional levels (i.e., t-tests for differences in means are all significant at the 1% level). 
Additionally, as reported in Table 6B, tweets by sophisticated investors have higher 
coefficients in predicting future abnormal return (coefficients of 0.0375 vs. 0.0252, and p-
value of the F-test=0.00) than tweets by unsophisticated investors. In summary, I find 
consistent evidence that investors’ self-reported sophistication levels capture real 
differences in investors’ underlying abilities and/or skills for collecting and process 
information related to the investment potential of stocks.  
3.3 Management Forecast Sample and Other Financial Data 
 Using the Thomson Reuters First Call database, I downloaded 23,166 management 
forecasts sample issued between 2009 and 2013. I eliminate “bundled” management 
forecasts made within -3 to +3 days of earnings announcements, identified using earnings 
announcement dates from Compustat and I/B/E/S.19 Following the identification method 
of Tang (2012), I further eliminate regularly made management forecasts.20 This data 
selection procedure yields a sample of 6,425 sporadic management forecasts. Following 
Baginki et al. (1993), I identify point and range forecasts conditioning on whether a single 
value or a range value has been released, and the explanatory phrases provided by First 
Call. Management forecasts made with only one estimation, and that do not contain 
conditioning phrases such as “greater than”, “less than” or “no more than”, are labeled as 
point forecasts; management forecasts with both upper and lower bonds, or with one bound 
and conditioning phrases are labeled as range forecasts (e.g. “EPS is greater than $1”). This 
                                                          
19 Following prior studies (e.g. DellaVigna and Pollett 2009), when the EA dates are available in both 
databases and are difference from each other, I take the date that report the earlier of the two. 
20 I applied a similar selection method of Tang (2014) to eliminate the recurring and therefore predictable 
management forecast; I look at two consecutive years and in which week the sample forecast happened, if it 
happens in the same week of year t and year t-1, then both forecasts will be dropped from my sample.   
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identification method yields a total of 1,061 point forecasts (16.72%), and 5,364 range 
forecasts (83.28%). The detailed decomposition of the management forecasts data are 
reported in Table 1 Panel D.  
 The original tweets sample spans from July of 2009 to end of 2013, covering 8,721 
identical tickers. After removing 1) Tickers that are non-US, 2) financial assets other than 
stocks (such as futures for indexes and exchange rates), I matched the ticker with 
Compustat and I/B/E/S to get financial and analyst following data. My final sample 
consists of 19,173 firm-years observations (for 4,701 firms). Stock price and trading data 
are from CRSP. The detailed construction of variables is reported in Appendix A. 
4. Research Design 
 To examine the effect of management forecasts on the degree of information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, I calculate daily measures 
for the degree of information asymmetry for one week before a sporadic management 
forecast is issued, to one week after the forecast; I also calculate daily information 
asymmetry for longer windows after the management forecast is issued. I compare the level 
of information asymmetry in the post management forecast periods with the level of 
information asymmetry in the pre-forecast period. Following Rogers et al. 2009, I calculate 
the change in information asymmetry using the following formula: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘1 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦71
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
)           𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘2 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦148
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
) 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘3 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦2115
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
)         𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘4 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦2822
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
) 
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 Using a weekly measure of information asymmetry (aggregation of daily 
information asymmetry) eliminates the day-of-the-week effect on information asymmetry 
arising from factors such as day-of-the-week variation in investors’ attention, market 
liquidity, etc. Because measures of change in information asymmetry are calculated 
relative to the same benchmark—level of information asymmetry one week prior to 
forecasts—they should be interpreted as the net effect of management forecasts on the 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. To further 
control for other firm and market characteristics that may affect information asymmetry, I 
employ regression analysis using the following equation: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5 |𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (1)    
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 |𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟|𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                             (2)    
 Equation 1 is used to test hypothesis 1. In Equation 1, Management Forecast is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i issued a sporadic management forecast on day t, and 
0 if firm i issued no management forecast on day t. When firm i has no management 
forecast on a given day t, I expect that the dependent variable that captures the change of 
information asymmetry in week following day t relative to the preceding day t to be zero. 
When a firm issues a management forecast on day t, as discussed in the hypothesis 
development section, 𝛽1would be significantly different from zero, indicating the impact 
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of management forecast on information asymmetry. A positive 𝛽1indicates an increase in 
information asymmetry following a management forecast, while a negative 𝛽1 indicates a 
decrease in the information asymmetry following the disclosure of a management forecast. 
 Equation 2 is used to test hypothesis 2. In equation 2, Point Forecast is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast, and 0 if the forecast is a range 
forecast. The sample used in this regression is limited to management forecast sample only, 
therefore results should be interpreted as the difference in the impact of a point forecast on 
information asymmetry and the impact of range forecast on information asymmetry. As 
discussed in hypothesis 2, a positive 𝛽1 indicates that a point forecast is associated with 
more information asymmetry than a range forecast, while a negative 𝛽1 indicates that a 
point forecast is associated with less information asymmetry than a range forecast. This 
regression is estimated in short term (one week) and longer term (up to four weeks) to study 
how the impact varies across time. I expect  𝛽1 to be negative or not significant in short 
term, and negative in the longer term.  
 The control variables are from the most recent annual filings prior to the issue date 
of the management forecast.  Specifically, firm characteristics such as size and market-to-
book ratios are calculated using data from firms’ most recent 10-K available from 
Compustat. Analyst following data is the natural log of 1 plus the number of analysts 
following the firm. The first regression includes firm fixed effect, the second regression 
includes industry fixed effect, standard errors are clustered by industry (2-digit SIC).  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Management Forecasts and Change in Information Asymmetry (H1) 
5.1.1 Univariate Result 
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 Figure 1 plots the average daily information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors relative to day 0, the issuance date for a sporadic management 
forecast. On average, information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors does not average to zero because sophisticated and unsophisticated investors each 
possess different information sets, even during the periods when there is no management 
forecast disclosure. We can identify a few patterns from Figure 1: First, information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors does not increase 
significantly in the three week window prior to the issuance of sporadic management 
forecasts, consistent with little additional private information collecting activities prior to 
sporadic management forecasts, consistent with sporadic management forecast not being 
anticipated by investors. Second, information asymmetry spikes on the day of management 
forecast issue date and stays higher than the pre-disclosure level for the first week 
following the forecast. This is consistent with new private information being triggered by 
management forecast, thus increasing information symmetry (e.g. Kim and Verrecchia 
1994), at least in short term. Third, after roughly a week following the management forecast 
issue data information asymmetry decreases to a level that is lower than the pre-disclosure 
level, and information asymmetry continues to decrease in the third week following the 
management forecast issue data. This finding shows that management forecasts increase 
information asymmetry in the short term, but decrease it in the longer term, consistent with 
management forecast leveling the informational playing field between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors in the longer term, i.e., after one week. 
 Table 7 Panel A reports a univariate test of changes in information asymmetry 
around sporadic management forecasts for MF-firms vs non-MF firms (firms that did not 
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issue MFs in the -30 to +30 window) matched Size, Book to Market and 2-digit SIC code. 
For non-MF firms, day 0 is set to the same day that its matched MF firm issues a 
management forecast. For matched non-MF firms, the changes in information asymmetry 
over the four weeks’ periods relative to information asymmetry in the preceding week are 
not significantly different from zero. However, MF firms experience higher information 
asymmetry in the first week (significant at 1% level), lower information asymmetry in the 
second and third weeks (significant at 5% level), and information asymmetry in the fourth 
week continues to be lower (marginal significant at 10% level) than the pre-disclosure level.  
5.1.2 Multivariate Result 
 Table 8 reports regression results for equation 1 which examines the change in 
information asymmetry around MFs, controlling for firm and market characteristics that 
are likely to contribute to these changes. In Column 1 of Table 8, the dummy variable MF 
has a significantly positive coefficient (p<0.01, two-tailed), suggesting that information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors increase in the short term 
following sporadic management forecasts. However, in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, the 
coefficients on Management Forecast are negative and significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that in the longer term following sporadic management forecasts, information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors decrease to a level that is 
lower than that in the period prior to the management forecast issue data. 
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5.2 Point Forecasts and Range Forecasts Subsamples (H2) 
5.2.1 Univariate Result 
 Next, to explore the effect of variation in the precisions of public disclosures on the 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors I partition the 
management forecast sample into point and range forecasts. Figure 2 separately plots the 
mean daily information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors 
relative to day 0 for point and range forecasts. We can conclude the following from this 
figure: First, pre-disclosure information asymmetry is not significantly different between 
these two types of management forecasts. Second, on average point forecasts have a 
smaller short-term increase in information asymmetry, consistent with more precise public 
disclosure triggering relatively less new private information, at least in the short term. Third, 
post-disclosure information asymmetry is lower for point forecast vs. range forecast, 
indicating that more precise public disclosure results in a larger long-term reduction in 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. For range 
forecasts, the long-term post-disclosure level of information asymmetry is unchanged from 
that in the pre-disclosure period. However for point forecasts it is lower. The long run 
reduction in information asymmetry following management forecasts is therefore 
attributable to the minority of management forecasts that are point forecasts. Table 7 Panel 
B reports a univariate test of the mean changes in information asymmetry around point and 
range forecasts. Point forecasts are associated with less of a short-term increase, and more 
long-term decrease, in information asymmetry than is the case for range forecasts.  
 
 
75 
 
5.2.2 Multivariate Result 
 Table 9 reports regression results for equation 2 which examines the change in 
information asymmetry around point vs. range management forecasts. The testing sample 
is limited to days when management forecasts are issued, so the results should be 
interpreted as the difference in the impact of point vs. range forecasts on information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. In Column 1 of Table 9, 
the dummy variable Point has a positive coefficient that is not significant, suggesting that, 
after controlling for firm and market characteristics, the short-term change in information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors is not significantly 
different between point and range forecasts. However, in Column 2 of Table 9, the 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that in the longer term 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors decrease more 
for point forecasts than for range forecasts. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 
2 that point forecasts reduce information asymmetry between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors more than range forecasts.  
6. Conclusions 
 This paper examines how public disclosures affect information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors using the setting of sporadic management 
forecasts. The level of information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors is specifically important to firms because it increases firms’ cost of capital 
through adverse selection problem. It is also important to regulators because its existence 
compromises the fairness of the stock market by making the informational playing field 
unleveled for sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Despite its importance, there is 
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no existing direct measure of the degree of information asymmetry between sophisticated 
and unsophisticated investors.  
 In this study, I use textual analysis to develop, demonstrate, and validate a direct 
measure of information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors 
based upon 11 million tweets posted on StockTwits.com, the most popular investment-
related social media micro-blogging website in the US. Using this new measure, I find that 
information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors increase in the 
short term following the issuance of sporadic management forecasts, and decrease to longer 
term to a level that is lower than that in prior to the issuance of the management forecast. 
Additionally, I document that point forecasts reduce information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors more than range forecasts.  
 This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it provides a 
new and direct measure of information asymmetry between specific classes of investors. 
This new measure overcomes the potential identification errors when assessing the 
information set of investors using analyst forecasts, and moreover it is available at higher 
frequency and applicable in a wide range of studies. Second, this paper adds to the literature 
on effects of public disclosures on the information asymmetry by showing that information 
asymmetry could arise from public disclosures due to differential interpretations of the 
disclosure, and that more precise disclosures have greater effect in reducing the information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Finally, this paper 
contributes to prior studies on investor sophistication by providing evidence that 
sophisticated investors and unsophisticated investors interpret public disclosures 
differently, at least in the short term.  
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 Taken together, this paper suggests that when studying the market consequences of 
public disclosures, one must take into consideration that these market consequences may 
be different for sophisticated vs. unsophisticated investors. It also suggests that some types 
of disclosure may perform better than others, in helping unsophisticated investors compete 
against sophisticated investors.
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This chart plots the mean daily information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Day 0 is the day that sporadic 
management forecast is issued by a firm, day t represents the information asymmetry on a trading day post (pre) the disclosure date. Information 
Asymmetry is the distance between sophisticated investors’ information and unsophisticated investors’ information, based on Tweets posted on 
StockTwits.com.  
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Figure 1 
Mean Information Asymmetry Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Investors
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This chart plots the mean daily information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors around 1) Point Forecast 2) Range 
Forecast. Day 0 is the day that sporadic management forecast is issued by a firm, day t represents the information asymmetry on a trading day 
post (pre) the disclosure date. Information Asymmetry is the distance between sophisticated investors’ information and unsophisticated investors’ 
information, based on Tweets posted on StockTwits.com.  
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Figure 2
Mean Information Asymmetrey Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Investors 
Around Sporadic and Range Management Forecasts  
Range Forecast Point Forecast
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Note: The variables are defined in appendix A.   
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Market Data 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Firm Daily Information            1,440,613  -0.326 0.694 -0.693 -0.405 0.173 
Daily Raw Return                660,480  0.001 0.034 -0.012 0.000 0.012 
Daily Abnormal Return                660,480  0 0.032 -0.010 -0.001 0.009 
CAR(1,3)                660,480  0 0.052 -0.019 -0.001 0.017 
CAR(1,5)                660,480  0 0.065 -0.024 -0.001 0.022 
S&P 500 Index Return                660,480 0.001 0.009 -0.004 0.001 0.005 
News Index                386,735  0.651 0.301 0.000 0.692 1.609 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristic Data 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Book to Market                  19,173  0.864 1.831 0.324 0.577 0.956 
Size                  19,173  12.725 2.097 11.191 12.650 14.130 
Leverage                  20,133  0.223 0.238 0.028 0.166 0.346 
Dividend Payout                  20,145  0.013 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.015 
Profitability                  19,507  0.065 0.243 0.027 0.096 0.154 
R&D Intensity                  19,999  0.121 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.043 
Sales Growth                  16,105  -0.063 0.596 -0.169 0.016 0.188 
Number of Analyst                  20,252  9.455 8.732 3.000 7.000 13.000 
Analyst Following                  20,252  2.019 0.828 1.386 2.079 2.639 
Panel C: Summary of Twitter Characteristics 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
length            7,857,953  15.06 7.11 9.00 15.00 21.00 
Positive Words            7,857,953  0.22 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Negative Words            7,857,953  0.54 0.86 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Meaningful Words            7,857,953  0.76 1.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Panel D: Management Forecast Characteristics 
Year No. of 
Management 
Forecasts 
No. of 
Sporadic 
Forecasts 
Percentage Mean 
Range 
Width 
Point 
Forecast 
Percentage of 
Point/Sporadic 
2009                    4,720          1,362  28.86% 0.00759 230 16.89% 
2010                    5,028          1,451  28.86% 0.00367 204 14.06% 
2011                    4,777          1,325  27.74% 0.00401 204 15.40% 
2012                    4,943          1,331  26.93% 0.00525 237 17.81% 
2013                    3,698              957  25.88% 0.00322 186 19.44% 
Total/Mean                  23,166          6,426  27.65% 0.00475 1061 16.72% 
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Table 2 Validity Check of Information Asymmetry Measure 
 
Panel A: Validity Check of Tweet-Level Information Extraction 
   1 2 3 4 5   
   User-identified info     
Text-based 
Info 
 
Negative Neutral Positive 
Difference 
2-1 (T-
Stat) 
Difference 
3-2 (T-
Stat)   
No. 209,808 8,948,128 718,618     
Mean -0.320 -0.187 -0.145 0.190*** 0.042***   
SD. 0.537 0.530 0.000 (113.06) (64.54)   
          
Panel B: Correlations Analysis of Information Extraction 
                                                   Info Extracted Using Different Method at Individual Twit Level   
   1 2 3 4 5   
1 User-Identified Info 1.00       
2 Reader-Identified Info 0.651*** 1.00      
3 Text-based Info 0.365*** 0.715*** 1.00     
4 Negative Words/Length -0.030*** -0.355*** -0.705*** 1.00    
5 Positive Words/Length 0.024*** 0.322*** 0.491*** -0.0064 1.00   
          
Panel C: Information and Divergence of Information at Firm-Day Level 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Firm-Day 
Info 
Divergence 
of Info 
Raw Return 
Abnormal 
Return 
Trading 
Volume 
Abnormal 
Volume 
Abnormal 
Volume of 
T+1 
1 1        
2 -0.1076* 1       
3 0.0296* 0.0617* 1      
4 0.0272* 0.0583* 0.9642* 1     
5 -0.0273* 0.1488* 0.0041* 0.0073* 1    
6          0.0002 0.0021* 0.2630* 0.2745* 0.0034* 1   
7          0.0001 0.0014* 0.1053* 0.1113* 0.0084* 0.0054* 1 
This table presents some basic characteristics of text-based information extraction. Panel A presents the 
summary of text-based information. Approximately 10% of all tweets come with a user-identified Information 
indicating “bullish” or “bearish”, rest are classified as “neutral”. Panel B presents the correlation between user-
identified information, reader-identified information and text-based information. Panel C presents the 
correlation between aggregated firm-day information and variation of Information (standard deviation of 
information for tweets), and several market level measures.   
* indicates significant at 0.1 level ** indicates significant at 0.05 level *** indicates significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 3: Return of Portfolio Formed on Firm-Level StockTwits Information Content 
 
    Most Negative     Most Positive       
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 Diff T-Stat P 
AR on Day T  
Mean -0.092% -0.058% -0.014% -0.080% 0.062% 0.196% 0.198% 0.183% 0.152% 0.196% 0.288%*** 
14.198 0.00 
Mean 
(no EA) 
-0.091% -0.060% -0.014% -0.055% 0.065% 0.197% 0.204% 0.169% 0.149% 0.191% 0.282%*** 13.945 0.00 
AR on T+1 
Day 
Mean -0.009% -0.018% -0.026% -0.187% -0.060% -0.010% 0.000% 0.036% 0.013% 0.017% 0.026%* 1.354 0.09 
Mean 
(no EA) 
-0.004% -0.011% 0.029% -0.142% -0.044% 0.001% 0.008% 0.019% 0.010% 0.014% 0.054% 0.953 0.17 
CAR (1,3) 
Mean -0.004% -0.082% -0.046% -0.151% -0.072% -0.070% -0.057% 0.039% 0.054% 0.058% 0.061%** 1.965 0.02 
Mean 
(no EA) 
0.000% -0.078% -0.052% -0.099% -0.050% -0.062% -0.046% 0.023% 0.051% 0.054% 0.054%** 1.958 0.02 
CAR (1,5) 
Mean -0.013% -0.128% -0.079% -0.269% -0.083% -0.090% -0.072% 0.042% 0.060% 0.120% 0.133%*** 3.348 0.00 
Mean 
(no EA) 
-0.009% -0.122% -0.083% -0.218% -0.066% -0.086% -0.064% 0.202% 0.055% 0.118% 0.127%*** 3.190 0.00 
No. of Observations 81,761 46,873 63,648 63,578 70,018 63,789 66,143 79,977 90,939 49,528 -- -- 
676,
254 
  
This table presents the market returns of 10 decile portfolio based on StockTwits information content, where 1st decile is the stock-day observations 
with the most negative information, and 10th decile is the stock-day observations with the most positive information.  Abnormal return and CAR are 
calculated using Fama & French size and valuation matched buy-and-hold abnormal return. Benchmark returns are 5(market cap) x5(book to market) 
portfolio returns provided on Kenneth French’s personal website. Event day has been adjusted to eliminate non-trading days. *,**, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 Firm Day StockTwits Information Content and Stock Return: Regression Analysis 
  Panel A: Dependent Var: Abnormal Return on Day T+1 Panel A: Dependent Var: CAR(1,3) 
  1  2  3  4   1  2  3  4   
Information 
Positiveness 0.0310 *** 0.0272 *** 0.0226 ** 0.0313 *** 0.0458 ** 0.0173 ** 0.0270 ** 0.0407 ** 
  3.02  2.75  -2.21  2.66   2.08  2.43  2.19  2.12   
Book to Market -0.0259 * -0.0230  0.0470 * 0.0199 ** -0.0367  -0.0615 * -0.0962 * 0.0296 ** 
  -1.95  -1.27  -1.85  2.41   -0.91  -1.80  -1.88  2.19   
Size -0.1681 *** -0.1568 *** -0.1369 *** -0.0028   -0.6218 *** -0.3573 *** -0.3117 *** -0.0038   
  -10.02  -7.45  -4.94  -0.69   -10.8  -9.44  -5.08  -0.58   
Analyst Following   -0.0763 * -0.1271 ** -0.0102     -0.2168 ** -0.1271 ** -0.0485 ** 
    -1.67  -2.10  -0.87     -2.02  -2.10  -2.53   
Leverage   0.0307  0.1774  -0.0175     -0.0442  0.6613  -0.0172   
    0.23  1.05  -0.51     -0.16  1.58  -0.51   
Profitability   -0.0104  0.1228  0.1193 *   0.2200  0.3127  0.3226 *** 
    -0.08  0.64  1.87     1.49  0.62  3.12   
R&D Intensity   0.0818  0.0105  0.0309     0.1535  0.1187  -0.0219   
    1.09  0.04  0.39     1.66  0.94  -0.17   
Sales Growth   0.0361 * 0.0003  -0.0024     0.0437 * -0.0368  -0.0262   
    1.68  0.02  -0.16     0.67  -0.75  -1.09   
Dividend Pay Out   1.5967 *** 1.1701  -0.1308     0.0173 *** 0.0279  -0.0754 * 
    3.37  1.56  -0.52     1.14  1.53  -1.84   
SP500 Index Return     0.4158  0.4445       0.5267  0.0966   
      0.54  0.74       0.83  0.98   
News     -0.0276  -0.0228       -0.0743 * -0.0596 ** 
      -1.03  -1.28       -1.65  -2.06   
                    
Intercept 2.4626 *** 2.5018 *** 2.5202 *** 0.0546   9.0436 *** 5.84781 *** 5.8647 *** 0.1812 ** 
No. of Obs  439,296   310,775   149,304   149,304   438,857   310,703    149,293   149,293    
Adjusted R-Squared 1.69%  2.11%  2.15%  1.79%   1.78%  2.29%  2.23%  1.93%   
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  NO   Yes  Yes  Yes  NO   
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  NO   Yes  Yes  Yes  NO   
This Table presents the multivariate regression result to test the validity of StockTwits content. Abnormal return in dependent variable is the Fama-French 
size and market to book matched buy and hold abnormal return. Information Positiveness is the average positiveness across all users on Stocktwits for 
stock i on day t. For detailed textual analysis, please see section 3. All firm characteristics are winsorized at 1% level.   
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Variance of Information and Abnormal Trading Volume 
  
Panel A: Dependent Var: Abnormal Trading Volume on Day 
T+1 
 
Panel A: Dependent Var: Aggregated Abnormal Trading 
Volume of Day(1,5) 
  1  2  3  1  2  3  
Variance of StockTwits 
Information 
0.49575 *** 0.38263 *** 0.24863 *** 
 
0.82666 *** 0.66723 *** 0.42952 *** 
26.8  31.27  23.19  24.46  27.02  19.10  
Book to Market 0.01436 * -0.00676  -0.01647 ** 0.09912 *** 0.00770  -0.04603 ** 
  1.67  -0.73  -1.95  6.31  0.41  -2.59  
Size -0.0130 ** -0.07910 ** -0.03880 * -0.03181 *** -0.02988 *** -0.01471 *** 
  -2.26  -2.27  -1.90  -3.39  -3.90  -2.59  
Analyst Following   -0.09358 *** -0.09398 ***   -0.29801 *** -0.25011 ** 
    -3.86  -4.12    -6.08  -5.20  
Leverage   -0.28944 *** 0.09283    -0.44796 *** 0.42922 ** 
    -4.93  1.17    -3.78  2.59  
Profitability   0.46622  0.07344    -0.24592 *** 0.41778 *** 
    1.3  1.16    -3.38  3.16  
R&D Intensity   0.01560  0.95954 ***   0.21608 *** 0.25560 *** 
    0.56  4.88    3.86  6.14  
Sales Growth   -0.02085 ** -0.03298 ***   -0.00518  -0.07585 *** 
    -2.19  -3.05    -0.27  -3.34  
Dividend Pay Out   -0.64957  -0.74490 *   -1.73677 ** -1.10526 * 
    -1.61  -1.70    -2.14  -2.29  
SP500 Index Return     -0.32746 ***     -0.96870 *** 
      -9.96      -11.37  
News     0.31765 ***     0.57047 *** 
      28.88      25.64  
              
Intercept 0.16533 *** 0.46289 *** 0.30998 *** 
 
0.44962 *** 1.27657 *** 0.73067 *** 
No. of Obs 337,421  273,029  111,841  449,524  315,884  150,992  
Adjusted R-Squared 2.25%  2.80%  5.13%  
 
2.05%  4.01%  3.17%  
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
This Table presents the regression result of abnormal trading volume and variance of StockTwits information at a firm-day level. Abnormal Trading 
Volume is calculated following Bamber (1996), as the difference between trading volume and the mean volume of pre 255 trading days. Divergence 
of StockTwits information is calculated as the standard deviation of the information of all tweets related to a stock on a given day, regardless of 
the sophistication levels of users.    
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Validity Checks of Self-Reported Levels of Sophistication 
 
Panel A Characteristics of Investor Groups: Are Self-Reported Levels Reliable? 
  Novice Intermediate Professional   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  
T-Test of Difference 
3-1 
No. of Users 
                 
42,828   
          
24,248   
              
10,713      
  55.06%  31.17%  13.77%     
No. of Tweets 3,653,701  3,537,599  3,144,622     
  35.35%  34.23%  30.42%     
No. of Tweets Per User 85.31  145.89  293.53  208.22 *** 
Length of Tweets 14.72  15.14  15.29  0.56 *** 
No. of Professional Terms 0.715  0.763  0.806  0.091 *** 
Information -0.178  -0.186  -0.161  0.017 *** 
Info. Precision 0.462  0.472  0.479  0.017 *** 
Followers 11.90  17.99  102.96  91.06 *** 
           
Table 6 Panel B Information of Different Groups and Predicting Power of Return 
  Dependent Variable: Abnormal Return of (1,5) Day    
  1  2  3     
Info-Sophisticated 0.0375 ***   0.0353 *** 
F-test of H0 
β(soph) =  
β(un-soph)   
  
F-Stats 
=11.64   
  3.03    2.85  
Info-Unsophisticated   0.0252 *** 0.0234 *** 
    2.84  2.63  
Control Variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept 0.0541 *** 0.0547 *** 0.0539  
No. of Obs    275,647   
        
275,151   
           
274,840   P-value   
        =0.000   
Adjusted R-Squared 2.09%  1.87%  2.11%     
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes     
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes     
 
This table presents the characteristics of users with different self-reported level of sophistications to establish 
the construct validity of level of sophistications. Panel A provides a summary of the users’ twitting activities. 
No. of Users is the total number of qualified users at each sophistication levels. No. Tweets is the total number 
of tweets posted by users of each sophistication level. Length of Tweets is the average words-per-tweet for 
each sophistication level. No. of Professional Terms is defined as the average number of Financial Terms used 
in each tweet defined by Dictionary of Financial and Business Terms (University of Toronto). Info. Precision is 
the standard Deviation of information within each sophistication level. Panel B reports the regression of CAR 
(1,5) on the information of Sophisticated and unsophisticated group. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7:  Change in Information Asymmetry around MF, Univariate Results 
Panel A: Change in Information Asymmetry around MF firm-day and around Non-MF firm-day 
  
MF-Firms Non-MF Firms Difference  
T-Test 
Statistics 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+1 
 
0.0866 0.0000 0.0867 *** 5.53 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+2 
 
-0.0313 0.0001 -0.0314 ** -2.08 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+3 
 
-0.0277 -0.0001 -0.0276 ** -1.82 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+4 
 
-0.0272 0.0000 -0.0272 * -1.66 
       
Panel B: Change in Information Asymmetry around point forecast and range forecast 
  
Point Forecast Range Forecast Difference  
T-Test 
Statistics 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+1 
 
0.0831 0.1050 -0.0219 ** 1.81 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+2 
 
-0.0590 -0.0260 -0.0330 ** -1.83 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+3 
 
-0.0323 -0.0269 -0.0055 ** -2.15 
Change in Info 
Asymmetry Week+4 
 
-0.0553 0.0021 -0.0574  -1.31 
       
 
This table presents the univariate test results of changes in information asymmetry between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors around management forecasts. Following Rogers et 
al. (2009), I estimate the change in information asymmetry using the following formula: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘+1 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦71
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
)           𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘+2 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦148
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
) 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘+3 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦2115
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
)         𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘+4 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦2822
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
) 
Panel A reports the mean change in information asymmetry around the release of Sporadic 
management forecasts for MF firms and Non-MF firms matched on size, Book to Market and 2-
digit SIC code. Panel B reports the mean change in information asymmetry (MF firms only) around 
a Point Forecast and around a Range Forecast. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Change in Information Asymmetry around MF- Multivariate Results 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in Information Asymmetry -
week1 
 
Change in Information Asymmetry - 
week2 
 
Change in Information Asymmetry - 
week3 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat P-Value  Coeff.  T-stat P-Value  Coeff.  T-stat P-Value 
Management Forecast  0.0916 *** 4.52 0  -0.0346 ** -2.08 0.041  -0.0335 ** -2.03 0.046 
Analyst Following -0.0122 *** -7.31 0  -0.0127 *** -5.67 0  -0.0127 *** -4.23 0 
Size 0.0004  0.32 0.752  0.0004  -0.26 0.794  -0.0011  -0.38 0.704 
Leverage 0.0040  0.78 0.435  0.0072  0.99 0.326  0.0105  1.02 0.312 
Book to Market 0.0001  0.13 0.894  0.0013  1.57 0.121  0.0024 ** 2.14 0.036 
|Forecast Error| -0.0032 ** -2.28 0.023  -0.0033 ** -2.3 0.021  -0.0031 ** -2.1 0.036 
Profitability -0.0038  -1.03 0.302  -0.0047  -1.24 0.215  -0.0051  -1.32 0.186 
News -0.0023  0.62 0.534  0.0120  0.35 0.726  0.0121  0.35 0.726 
                
Intercept 0.0286 * 1.93 0.058  0.0408  1.59 0.116  0.0465  1.25 0.214 
No. of Obs    2,519,634      2,519,634     2,519,634     
Adjusted R-Squared 3.80%     4.10%     4.00%     
Industry Fixed Effect Yes     Yes     Yes     
Year Fixed Effect Yes     Yes     Yes     
Error Clustered by  Industry     Industry     Industry       
This table presents the multivariate regression result of equation 1 to study the change in information asymmetry around the release of MF, controlling 
for firm characteristics and market characteristics. Observations include firm-day observations with and without MF releases (Management Forecast is 
a dummy variable set to 1 if there is MF release on the day).  Dependent variables are change in information asymmetry for weeks following the release 
of MF compared one week prior to MF (see table 7 for detail).  Industry and year fixed effect are included, errors are clustered by 2-digit SIC code.  
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Table 9: Change in Information Asymmetry around point and range MF- Multivariate Results 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Change in Information 
Asymmetry -week1  
Change in Information  
Asymmetry - week2   
 Change in Information  
Asymmetry - week3 
Variable Coeff.  T-stat P-Value  Coeff.  T-stat P-Value  Coeff.  T-stat P-Value 
Point Forecast 0.0051  0.590 0.556  -0.0101 ** -2.280 0.026  -0.0206 ** -2.390 0.017 
Analyst Following 0.2971 * 1.780 0.080  0.3294 *** 5.670 0.001  0.3552 *** 4.110 0.005 
Size 0.0593  0.700 0.488  -0.0473  -0.880 0.382  -0.0547  -0.270 0.787 
Leverage 0.9140  1.650 0.104  0.5587  1.540 0.128  0.2133 * 1.667 0.094 
Book to Market 0.0041  0.260 0.795  -0.0091  -0.390 0.699  -0.0179  -0.160 0.875 
|Forecast Error| 0.0304  0.480 0.635  -0.0203  -0.330 0.742  0.0191  0.290 0.772 
Profitability -0.0680  -0.300 0.761  -0.0878  -0.410 0.683  -0.0728  -0.351 0.726 
News 0.0123  0.550 0.537  0.0458  0.471 0.621  0.0425  0.581 0.511 
               
Intercept -0.8017  -1.400 0.167  -0.4017  -0.460 0.650  -0.4917  -0.350 0.726 
No. of Obs 3824     3,824      3,824     
Adjusted R-Squared 1.50%     3.40%      2.47%     
Industry Fixed Effect Yes     Yes     Yes     
Year Fixed Effect Yes     Yes     Yes     
Error Clustered by Industry     Industry     Industry       
This table presents the multivariate regression result of equation 2 to study the change in information asymmetry around the release of point forecast 
vs. range forecast, controlling for firm characteristics and market characteristics. Observations include firm-day observations when MF releases (Point 
Forecast a dummy variable set to 1 if a point forecast is released on the day).  Dependent variables are change in information asymmetry for weeks 
following the release of MF compared one week prior to MF (see table 7 for detail).  Industry and year fixed effect are included, errors are clustered 
by 2-digit SIC code. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
Variables Name Definitions Source 
Tweet Information 
Information of each tweet is calculated as natural log of 
number of the difference between positive words and 
negative words in a tweet. The classification of positive 
words and negative words is done with Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) Financial Sentiment Dictionary, 
Information calculation follows Antweiler and Frank 
(2004): 
𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1 + 𝑃
1 + 𝑁
) 
StockTwits 
Firm-Daily Information 
Firm Daily Information is the aggregated information 
(mean) of individual information of all tweets that 
mentioned stock i on day t. Information is adjusted by the 
trading hour: tweet posted after 4pm is adjusted to the next 
trading day. 
StockTwits 
User-Identified 
Information 
When posting a tweet, user can voluntarily choose to 
disclosure her/his information on the stock mentioned, by 
selecting a slider between “bullish” or “bearish”. In my 
sample, about 10% of all tweets have this information 
available. This information is used to check the validity of 
text-based information using textual analysis. 
StockTwits 
Reader-Identified 
Information 
I randomly select 3,000 tweets from the sample. Risk neutral 
reader reads the tweets and assign the tweets into three 
groups: positive, neutral, negative. This information is used 
to check the validity of text-based information using 
algorithm. 
StockTwits 
Information 
Asymmetry (between 
sophisticated and 
unsophisticated 
investors) 
Information Asymmetry is the distance (absolute value of 
difference) between mean information of sophisticated 
investors (those who identify themselves as “professional”) 
and the mean information of unsophisticated investors 
(those who identify themselves as “novice”) related to a 
given stock on a given day. 
StockTwits 
Changes in Information 
Asymmetry 
Change in information asymmetry (week i) for day t, is the 
sum of information asymmetry from +1 day to +7 day, 
relative to the sum of information asymmetry from -7 day to 
-1 day. Following Rogers et al. (2009), formally defined as: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘1 = 𝑙𝑛 (
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦71
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦(−1)(−7)
) 
StockTwits 
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StockTwits Information 
Divergence 
StockTwits Information Divergence is the standard 
deviation of all users’ information related to a given stock 
on a given day, regardless of the sophistication level of 
users. 
StockTwits 
Information Precision 
of Investor Group 
Information precision of investor group is the standard 
deviation of information related to a given stock on a given 
day given by users of one level of sophistication. 
StockTwits 
Point Forecast 
Point Forecast is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when the 
second estimation value in the first call detail tape is 
missing, indicating that manager only provides on 
estimation for future earnings. This classification is double 
checked by examining the textual presentation in the 
“comment” section. 
First Call 
Sporadic Forecast 
Sporadic Forecast is identified by first eliminating the MF 
made within -3 to +3 days of an earnings announcements 
(identified using Compustat and IBES, which ever date is 
earlier). Second, I look at two consecutive years and in 
which week the sample forecast happened, if it happens in 
the same week of year t and year t-1, then both forecasts will 
be considered “regular” and dropped. 
First Call 
Raw Return Raw return is the RET from CRSP data base CRSP 
Abnormal Return of 
Day t 
Abnormal Return is the raw return of firm i on day t and the 
benchmark return of firm i’s matched portfolio based on 
(5x5 size and market-to-book ratio). Benchmark portfolio is 
formed following Fama French method, benchmark return is 
acquired from Kenneth French’s personal website. 
CRSP/ 
Kenneth 
French 
CAR[i,j] 
CAR(i,j) is defined as the difference between the buy and 
hold return (BAHR) for stock k from day i to day j, and the 
buy and hold return of the benchmark group for the same 
period.  
CRSP 
Abnormal Trading 
Volume 
Abnormal Trading Volume is the natural log of trading 
volume on day t minus its average trading volume for the 
previous 255 trading days.  
CRSP 
Trading Volume Trading Volume is the VOL from CRSP data base CRSP 
Absolute Value of S&P 
500 Daily Change 
Absolute Value of S&P 500 Index Daily Change CRSP 
Book to Market 
BOOKTOMARKET is the book value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity. Ratio of book value of common 
equity to market capitalization (CEQQ/[PRCCQ * 
Compustat/ 
CRSP 
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CSHOQ]), If CEQQ is missing, book value of common 
equity will be calculated as ATQ-LTQ 
Size 
The natural log of lagged market capitalization on the day of 
last annual report 
Compustat/ 
CRSP 
Leverage 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of long term liability to total assets 
from most recent balance sheet disclosures. 
Compustat 
Dividend Payout 
Dummy Variable if firm t has dividend paid to the investors 
within the last fiscal year 
Compustat 
R&D Intensity 
R&D intensity is an indicator variable if the ratio of R&D 
expense to total expense falls in the upper quartile of sample 
firms. 
Compustat 
Analyst Following 
ANALYST FOLLOWING is the natural log of 1+ latest 
number of analysts following the firm. 
I/B/E/S 
Profitability 
Profitability is measured as EBITDA of a firm in the last 
annual report, divided by the total value of assets in the last 
annual report. 
Compustat 
Sales Growth 
Sales Growth is the year-to-year change in the total revenue 
reported in latest annual report 
Compustat 
Forecast Error 
Mean of the Absolute value of the forecast error (actual 
EPS-consensus EPS) for the past 12 fiscal quarters, scaled 
by stock price. 
I/B/E/S 
News Natural log of number of news articles on Factiva Factiva 
Industry Dummy 2-digit SIC classification Compustat 
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Appendix B 
 
Most frequently mentioned Positive and Negative Words in Tweets 
 
 Top Positive Words  Top Negative Words 
Rank Frequency Cumulative Word  Frequency Cumulative Word 
1 3.60% 3.60% GAIN  5.21% 5.21% LOSES 
2 2.66% 6.26% FRIENDLY  3.01% 8.22% FAIL 
3 2.14% 8.40% BOOST  2.92% 11.14% SHORT 
4 1.31% 9.71% ABLE  2.48% 13.62% BREAK 
5 1.23% 10.93% GOOD  1.52% 15.14% LIE 
6 0.89% 11.82% STRENGTHEN 1.39% 16.53% LATE 
7 0.87% 12.69% BUY  0.86% 17.39% BAD 
8 0.77% 13.46% STRONG  0.83% 18.22% MISS 
9 0.59% 14.05% BEST  0.66% 18.88% WORSE 
10 0.59% 14.65% HAPPY  0.63% 19.50% LOSS 
11 0.39% 15.04% POPULAR  0.57% 20.07% LACK 
12 0.32% 15.36% GAINING  0.55% 20.62% WEAK 
13 0.30% 15.65% EASILY  0.52% 21.15% WRONG 
14 0.26% 15.91% IMPROVE  0.50% 21.65% LAG 
15 0.23% 16.15% EXCITED  0.46% 22.11% CUT 
This Appendix reports the top 15 most frequently mentioned Positive words and Negative words identified in the Tweets 
sample used in this study. I use Loughran and McDonald (2011) Financial Sentiment Dictionary to classify the sentiment 
of words with Bag-of-Words method to classify negative and positive words. Frequency is calculated as the total number 
a keyword is mentioned divided by the total number of words in tweet sample.
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